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shocks  determines  conditions  in  the  labour  market  and  sort  individuals  into  three  labour  market 
regimes;  employment,  unemployment  with  and  unemployment  without  participation  in  labour 
market  programmes.  The  structural  model  entails  time  independent  stochastic  shocks  that  have 
transitory effects on monetary returns while the effect on human capital formation may be permanent. 














 1  Introduction
1 
The aim of most Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMP) is to increase and improve 
the employment chances of programme participants by increasing (or avoiding a reduction of) 
their productive capacity. Microeconometric evaluation studies usually focus on the participant’s 
success in improving his labour market status with respect to the programme’s targeted labour 
market outcome (e.g., Lechner and Gerfin, 2002). But this classic partial equilibrium approach 
may undervalue the long-term intrinsic benefits of ALMP participation in terms of human capital 
(productive capacity). This paper aims at modelling and estimating human capital gains in the 
presence of ALMP using the Swiss labour market for the empirical illustration. 
We develop a structural life-cycle model of labour supply with endogenous human capital 
formation. Drawing from Magnac and Robin (1991, 1996) we define a behavioural model where 
optimizing individuals chose among mutually exclusive labour market regimes that determine 
their participation decisions in the labour market. Heterogeneous individuals (with respect to 
skill formation) make labour market and consumption decisions accounting for idiosyncratic 
stochastic shocks that inform them about the contemporaneous state of nature in the labour 
market. Although the shocks are purely transitory in nature, they are modelled to have a perma-
nent effect on the stock of human capital. Assuming a learning-by-doing environment, the 
contemporaneous accumulation of human capital increases the productive capacity of individuals 
within their skill class thus reducing the risk from labour market participation in the future. The 
model implies that the opposite may be true if human capital depreciates as a result of un-
employment spells where lost skill specific knowledge may increase the risk associated with the 
                                                           
1   Michael Lechner is also affiliated with CEPR, London, ZEW, Mannheim, IZA, Bonn, PSI, London, and IAB, Nuremberg. We appreciate 
comments by participant of the 2006 IZA/IFAU conference in Uppsala, the 2006 CEPR conference in Kiel, the 2006 ISB-Nuremberg 
Conference on Active and Passive Labour Market Policies, by participants of seminar at the University of Valencia and at the University of 
St.Gallen. In particular we are grateful for comments by Francisco Javier Ferri, Javier Andres, and Gerard van den Berg. Financial support 
from the Swiss National Founds under project No. 1214-066928 is gratefully acknowledged.  
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choice of working in future periods. ALMP can be thought as reducing the risk of human capital 
depreciation. The structural model in this paper allows for three labour market regimes (employ-
ment, unemployment with ALMP, and unemployment without ALMP). It determines identifying 
conditions for the estimation of the parameters associated with human capital growth and 
depreciation.  
Using the 14 waves (1991 to 2004) from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SAKE) – a 
rotating panel – we estimate human capital appreciation and depreciation for Switzerland. For 
example., we show that having experienced unemployment for up to 1.5 years leads to a loss in 
productively equal to about 10% for the lowest skill class (if they have previous labour market 
experience lasting for at most 2 years). However, for an otherwise identical individual with 
higher skills the loss in productive capacity increases to more than 40%. Although our estimates 
are not always precise enough, they are consistent with the underlying assumptions in our model. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of modelling ALMP 
and relates that to the situation in Switzerland. Section 3 introduces a dynamic labour supply 
model  with  endogenous  human  capital  formation.  Section  4  derives  the  econometric 
identification conditions and describes the estimation methods. Section 5 presents the data. 
Section 6 shows the results and Section 7 concludes. Further technical material is relegated to the 
appendices that can be downloaded from the internet at www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lifecycle. 
2  ALMP, stochastic shocks and human capital formation 
During the 1990s many continental European countries introduced wide-ranging active 
labour market policies (ALMP) to combat the then rising levels of unemployment, e.g., the 1997 
expansion of active labour market policies in Switzerland. Following on the footsteps of program 
evaluation in North America (see for example Ashenfelter and Card, 1985, Angrist and Krueger,  
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1999,  or  the  survey  by  Heckman,  LaLonde  and  Smith,  1999)  alongside  the  widespread 
introduction of ALMP in western economies, research aimed at evaluating ALMP effectiveness 
has surged on both sides of the Atlantic. Specifically in Switzerland, studies by Gerfin and 
Lechner (2000, 2002) or Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2001) have focused on evaluating the 
direct  effect  on  employment  of  specific  policies  using  as  key  identification  strategy  the 
assumption that labour market outcomes and the selection process into the programme are 
independent events conditional on observed heterogeneity, while the outcome of interest is the 
direct effect on the participation’s labour status at some point in the future. In such fairly 
nonparametric econometric studies, the effects of the programme on the accumulation of human 
capital have to remain implicit, as human capital is a theoretical concept that cannot be directly 
measured in the data. Yet, it is the stock of human capital that matters when determining 
individual’s chances of employment.  
At a micro-economic level, studying human capital accumulation requires life-cycle 
models that capture the interaction between individual’s preferences and the dynamics in the 
labour market (e.g., Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen, 1990, or Browning, Hansen and Heckman, 
1999). Our structural model aims at modelling such dynamics drawing from the framework in 
Magnac and Robin (1991, 1996) to define a behavioural problem where optimizing individuals 
chose among mutually exclusive labour market regimes and participation decisions. In doing so, 
we extend the structural model in Costa-Dias (2002) by introducing human capital depreciation 
in the event of unemployment. Conditional on skill class the model by Costa-Dias (2002) 
assumes that new arrivals to the unemployment pool (with or without ALMP) are identical to the 
long term unemployed regarding productive capacity (human capital). However, in European 
economies unemployment duration is a key determinant of future employment chances and 
unemployment outflow rates. In these economies, long-term unemployment has detrimental  
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effects  on  individual’s  productive  capacity  as  well  as  on  the  physical  and  psychological 
wellbeing (Machin and Manning, 1998). Thus, our structural model introduces ALMP as a policy 
measure designed to combat these 'side-effects' of unemployment.  
A key issue in this paper is individual heterogeneity, a concept that is undermined in life-
cycle models with macroeconomic foundations even if these later aim at capturing the dynamics 
of labour market choices allowing for endogenous human capital formation. Models that focus 
on macroeconomic fluctuations often estimate endogenous human capital formation conditional 
on changes defined by key macroeconomic variables. For example, Perroni (1995) models 
human capital formation endogenously conditional on individual’s aggregate investment choices 
which may differ in the presence of different income or consumption taxes; Nunziata (2003) 
considers  the  effect  of  macroeconomic  shocks  in  a  dynamic  model  of  unemployment 
determination; Albrecht (2002) builds a theoretical model that determines skill specific human 
capital formation conditional on key macroeconomic parameters while simulating human capital 
formation conditional on the economy’s demand for skills. In contrast to our assumptions, 
Perroni’s (1995) set-up does not assume stochastic shocks whereas common to our assumptions 
both Nunziata (2003) and Albrecht (2002) allow for labour market shocks. However, whereas 
Nunziata (2003) and Albrecht (2002) assume common shocks to all individuals over time, we 
assume labour market shocks to differ among individuals with such heterogeneity playing a 
central  role  in  the  choice  of  labour  market  regimes,  a  choice  that  eventually  determines 
endogenous human capital formation.
2  
                                                           
2   Other models (e.g., Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg, 1999) allow for individual’s heterogeneity within their 
dynamic framework but the aim in these papers focus on search theory and not on individual specific human 
capital formation. See Regerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for a recent survey on dynamic labour market 
literature.  
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The key dynamics in our model imply that individuals enter the market with an exo-
genously given skill class (i.e., start-up education) and their human capital (i.e., productive 
capacity) may increase within skill class as result of working in a learning-by-doing environ-
ment.  Different  investment  decisions  result  from  individual’s  idiosyncratic  labour  market 
histories combined with their evaluation of stochastic changes in the state of the labour market 
resulting from time independent stochastic labour market shocks. Thus, individuals with similar 
skills and labour market experience may differ in preferences and human capital investment 
choices. This reasoning may explain the empirically observed difference in returns between 
individuals with similar skills (see Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).  
Clearly, unemployment can lead to a loss of human capital. Being unemployed may 
imply loosing touch with the up-to-date skill specific knowledge demanded by constantly 
incoming new vacancies. Thus, c.p. new arrivals to the pool of unemployment are closer to 
fulfilling the skill-specific knowledge required by new incoming vacancies. This contrasts with 
participating in ALMP that may lead to maintaining (or increase) pre-unemployment pro-
ductivity levels. 
A consequence of allowing for stochastic labour market shocks in our model is that 
choices of labour market regimes are not-deterministic following closely the key modelling 
assumptions in Huggett (1997) and Huggett and Ventura (1999) where idiosyncratic shocks 
determine individual’s state of nature at each point in time. The shocks affect individual’s 
contemporaneous opportunity cost of participating (or not) in paid labour market activities. As in 
Huggett (1997) it is assumed that prices (e.g. wages, interest rates, etc) are deterministic with 
price fluctuations resulting from the shocks that directly determine individual’s capital holding 
over time. We differ from Huggett (1997) in that we allow for alternative labour market regimes 
when setting up the individual’s decision problem thus following closely to Magnac and Rubin  
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(1991, 1996) where the representative agent can choose between alternative working modes (in 
their case, between wage-work and self-employment). Our model is such that individuals hold 
‘latent’ or hidden valuations on each possible labour market regime. These valuations reflect for 
example the individual’s perceived cost of participation in ALMP that could change if the state 
of the world changes as result of idiosyncratic stochastic labour market shocks. Before the shock 
is realized the agent is uncertain about his or her labour endowments and total asset holdings. 
Once the shock is realized the state of the world (i.e., the individual’s idiosyncratic value of each 
alternative regime) is known and the agent chooses the optimal labour market regime according 
to the new state. The arguments are similar to those in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Magnac 
and Robin (1991) where it is also assumed that individual’s uncertainty on future labour market 
returns can be explained by attitudes towards risk, where ‘risk’ is thought as ‘opportunity costs’ 
among alternatives choices. In our model, we consider the ‘risk’ of different alternatives as the 
differences  in  opportunity  cost  between  them,  where  such  cost  may  depend  on  personal 
characteristics and the idiosyncratic view of the state of nature in the labour market (see Cossa, 
Heckman and Lochner, 2003). The shocks are not observed by the econometrician. Instead, 
individuals' choices with regards to labour market regimes reveal the magnitude of the shocks 
relative to individuals' reservation entry values into each of the different labour market regimes. 
A positive and sufficiently large shock implies a working decision. If the shock is not sufficiently 
large to imply a working regime the individual will choose unemployment. In the event that the 
shock is ‘sufficiently bad’ it will place the individual in a regime of no work and no ALMP par-
ticipation that may include the option to search in the open market, or not to search and leave the 
labour market. Our model is such that whereas the permanent component of the transitory shock 
may differ by labour market regime, in all three regimes the effects of the shock are permanently 
reflected by their effects on human capital. This argument implies that ALMP can be viewed not  
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just as a set of instruments to make the unemployed more marketable but also as a mean to help 
them keep their human capital stock relative to their most recent employment spell. Taking all 
the above arguments into account, we think of accumulated human capital as providing an 
insurance against risk (i.e., it lowers the relative opportunity cost of employment by increasing 
its returns) while each individual’s taste for risk depends on individual characteristics and past 
labour market history. 
The above arguments imply that evaluating the impact of ALMP requires us to examine 
the dynamics of the labour market in the economy where both ‘earnings’ and ‘benefits’ are 
thought as best signals in terms of disentangling the behaviour of the active population with 
regards to labour market choices. Our proposed structural life-cycle model mimics the arguments 
just mentioned with regards to the dynamics of labour-supply behaviour, of human capital 
formation, earnings and unemployment insurance. Ultimately, the structural model provides the 
benchmark to determine the necessary conditions to identify and estimate key human capital 
parameters (growth and depreciation) conditional on skill class. 
3  A model of labour supply with stochastic shocks 
3.1  Notation and model outline 
The fundamental problem for the representative individual i  is to maximise utility (u) 
coming from consumption (c) subject to the endogenous evolution of assets (a) and human 
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According to (1), individual i  enters the labour market at time  0 t =  and retires at T . 
Optimal allocation of lifetime resources implies maximizing expected discounted utility over the 
entire working horizon (i.e. from  0 to   t t T = = ) where β  is the discount factor. The individual’s 
objective  is  summarized  with  a  separable  time-variant  utility  function  ( ) t t it u u c =   where 
consumption  it c  at t  is the only argument. Beyond contemporaneous t  future realisations of the 
shocks  it π  are unknown (only the distribution is assumed known). Thus, at each point in time the 
individual evaluates each labour market choice  it I  and takes action accounting for the remaining 
lifetime subject to the contemporaneous state of nature that contains information from all the 
stochastic realisations in the past. At the point of labour market entry individual’s skill class s  is 
fully determined by their start-up education, thus s  enters exogenously and remains unchanged 
throughout life. Thus, labour market history will explain ‘skill-specific knowledge’ within the 
skill class. Together with the price vector  t ψ , the vector  it X ɶ  defines the state of nature at t  for 
the individual i , where  it X ɶ  indicates that the state of the world is a function of his skill class s , 
accumulated returns at t  ( , it it a h ) and the time-independent idiosyncratic labour market shock 
received at t ,  it π . We also define  ( , ) it it it X a h =  as the vector containing the endogenous state 
variables for an individual i  with skill class s . The vector of prices  t ψ  describes a deterministic 
sequence of wages and benefits for any s  skill class at time t ,  st W  and  st B , earnings tax at t ,  t τ , 
and the rate of return from asset investments at t ,  t r . Furthermore, we assume that participants in 
active labour market programmes face a cost  st P  (non-pecuniary or otherwise) of programme  
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participation  that  is  also  assumed  to  vary  over  time  and  by  skill-class.  The  indicator 
1, , ,
j
it I j w n q = =  explains the individual’s labour market choice at  t ; at any given  t ,  1
w
it I =  
implies working whereas either  1
q
it I =  (unemployed with ALMP) or  1
n
it I =  (unemployed without 
ALMP) indicate non-working. The three choices are mutually exclusive and add-up to one for 
each individual at any  [0, ] t T ∈ . The model in (1) shows that consumption and labour market 
participation are the only choice variables. Unlike consumption, labour market choices are 
modelled discretely so that the solution to the problem in (1) solves for three mutually exclusive 
optimal consumption paths, one for each of the three labour choices in the current period. The 
indicator function 1( ) i s s =  clarifies that earnings are skill specific. They vary over time for each 
individual within skill class. For example, the term  st W  is a vector of prices of dimension equal to 
the number of skills in the population; allowing for 1( ) i s s =  implies that  st W  becomes  ( ) s i t W ,  st B  
becomes  ( ) s i t B  and  st P  becomes  ( ) s i t P . 
The structural set-up in (1) is a dynamic problem where stochastic shocks determine labour 
market choices according to the combined effect that such shocks have on physical and human 
capital. In the absence of shocks the model is a deterministic partial equilibrium model where 
agents would have remained from  0 t =  to T  in one of the three labour market regimes defined 
according to initial stocks of assets and skill specific choices at the point of entering the labour 
market. Stochastic shocks and individual’s evaluation of these stochastic changes lead to the 
potential to shift between labour market regimes. In allowing for stochastic labour market shocks 
the framework follows that of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Magnac and Robin (1991, 
1996). As in their case, the dynamics in (1) are such that at the beginning of each discrete period 
the shocks are revealed and the individual chooses an optimal labour market regime. Earning’s 
uncertainty (i.e., price uncertainty) plays no role in evaluating present and future values of the  
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available  choice  set.  Instead,  observing  stochastic  shocks  reveals  information  on  the 
contemporaneous state of nature thus helping the individual to exercise a labour market choice 
relative to the individual’s risk attitude towards each of the labour market alternatives. The risk 
attitude itself is the result of individual’s own valuation of personal characteristics and past 
labour market history. For example, at time t  a low skill individual has a valuation for each of 
the three labour market regimes that may lead to a choice of ALMP participation as opposed to 
working.  The  choice  would  signal  that  conditional  on  the  individual’s  contemporaneous 
productivity level, working is a riskier choice when comparing the returns from work (i.e., 
combined assets and human capital) to those received when participating in ALMP. We think of 
labour  choices  as  ‘risky’  choices  because  contemporaneous  decisions  imply  permanent 
investment effects in terms of human capital stocks. For example, assume that at time  1 t +  the 
same individual receives a positive shock  1 it π +  perceived as relatively high (e.g., a wage subsidy 
that pays above the individual’s productive capacity). The structural model in (1) implies that the 
choice  to  work  (i.e.,  1 1
w
it I + = )  could  become  more  attractive  relative  to  receiving  either 
{ }
1 1 1 1 ( );
it
q
st st it I B P h
+ + + + −   or  ( ) { } { }
1 1 1 1 1 ( ); exp ,
it
n
st it i it it I B h s h σ π
+ + + + + ⋅ − ,  thus,  the  perceived  ‘high’ 
(idiosyncratic) shock implies that the combined returns from assets and human capital from a 
working choice,  ( ) { } { } (1 ) ; exp ,
it
w
st t it it it i it it I W h h s h τ π υ π − ⋅ , makes the latter the optimal 'investment' 
decision. The result is that physical assets ( ) 1 it a +  and human capital ( ) 1 it h +  accumulate where the 
latter does so at the rate of  ( , ) t s h υ  with obvious permanent positive effects in terms of increased 
future productivity capacity. The parameter  ( , ) i it s h υ  depends on  it h  because ‘learning-by-doing’ 
depends on the individual’s contemporaneous stock of knowledge (i.e., stock of human capital 
it h ). But if today’s human capital increases, tomorrow’s opportunity cost of not working 
increases relative to the gains implied by either of the two unemployment regimes and, therefore,  
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working becomes more likely in periods ahead. The example illustrates the permanent effect of a 
transitory positive shock. A contrasting example is that where the shock  it π  may be perceived as 
‘low’ so that  ( ) { } { } { } ( , , ) 0 ( , , ) 0 (1 ) ; exp , | , |
it
w
st t it it it i it it st I i t q it I i t q I W h h s h B h τ π υ π = = − ⋅ < , that is, benefits 
resulting from any of the two unemployment alternatives may imply a lower risk (opportunity 
cost) than working for wages. Choosing unemployment may lead to spells where productive 
capacity either remains constant or depreciates at a rate of  ( , ) i it s h σ , thus making working in the 
future a riskier option, i.e., unemployment could lower productive capacity  it h  and with this 
reduce the total net gains (i.e., 
1 1 1 1 1 (1 )
it
w
st t it it I W h τ π
+ + + + + − ) from working in periods ahead. The 
structural model in (1) implies that for unemployment alternatives the effect of the shocks have 
only a direct effect on human capital. In sum, the shocks determine the state of nature at which 
point individuals evaluate and chose a labour market regime. The choice involves an attitude to-
wards risk that involves comparing individual’s preference and characteristics. For individual 
that take unemployment as the optimal choice, the shock determines the benefit of seeing  it h  de-
crease relative to that associated with the cost implied by ALMP, that is,  st P . 
3.2  The Bellman representation 
The dynamic problem described in (1) is formulated in terms of multiplicative stochastic 
shocks  it π  and the two endogenous state variables  ( , ) it it a h . The solution to the problem is a 
sequence of consumption choices { } 0
T
it t c
=  among all admissible sequences for each of the discrete 
labour market regimes, conditional on initial and final conditions (i.e.,  0 0 0, 0
s
t t a h = = = >  and 
0, 0 T T a h ≥ > , respectively); these conditions pin down sets of admissible consumption paths. We 
choose to characterise the problem with recursive methods in terms of a value function. The 
model in (1) allows for time independent shocks with the permanent effects of these picked up by  
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physical and human capital, the only two components that carry information from today to the 
future. Thus, as function of these two variables the model in (1) provides the classic set up for the 
Bellman representation that relates current value functions  ( , , ) t V a h π  – i.e., the value of the 
maximised problem conditional on all possible paths at  t – to expectations of future value 
functions  1( , , ) t V a h π +  assuming knowledge of the shocks up to  t and discounted back to 
contemporaneous values: 
{ } ( ) { }
0
1 1 1 1 1
,




it it it it t it it it it it t
c I
V a h u c E V a h π π ψ β π ψ
=
+ + + + +   = + ⋅   .  (2) 
The value function in (2) summarizes the skill-specific individual’s problem representing 
current and future values of the optimal consumption path that changes as the state variables 
change over the planning horizon. However, a unique solution characterizing the individual’s 
optimal choice is only possible if the value function in (2) is well behaved, that is, if expression 
(2) complies with a set of regularity conditions that imply a unique solution for the individual’s 
optimal consumption path for each of the discrete labour market choices.  
3.3  Assumptions 
We now turn to list a set of necessary assumptions that provide the necessary conditions 
to derive a set of premises to proof that the problem in (2) is well behaved. 
Assumption 1 (shocks): Stochastic labour market shocks π  are assumed to be iid  in-
dependent across time and individuals with known and continuously (at least once) differentiable 
distribution function on a bounded non-negative support [ , ] π π . 
Assumption 2 (utility function):  ( ) t t it u u c =  depends on consumption only and is strictly 
increasing, twice differentiable, and concave in its argument. 
Assumption 3 (state space): Both state space vectors spanned by the state variables  
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( , , ) it it it it X a h π = ɶ  or  ( , ) it it it X a h =  are assumed to be continuous, bounded and convex. Skill type 
( i s ) is also part of the individual’s state space but we assume it to be exogenous and constant 
throughout the planning horizon. 




i h h = > . Terminal 
conditions are assumed to be such that  , 0 i T a ≥  and  , 0 i T h > . 
Assumption 5 (non-crossing): The value function is assumed to have a derivative in the 
neighbourhood of zero that tends towards −∞  from the right. 
Assumption 6 (absolute risk aversion): Individuals display decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, with risk attitudes towards labour market choices that change in the opposite direction 
of assets, but with changes that are never far from zero in magnitude. Technically, this implies 
degrees of risk aversion such that ( ) 0
R
a a π ∂ ∂ ≤  and ( ) 0
R
b a π ∂ ∂ ≤ , where  ,
R R
a b π π  stand for the 
reservation levels that determine choices between different regimes in the labour market and 
' ' a  stands for ‘capital assets’. 
Assumption 7 (human capital growth and depreciation):  () 0 v ⋅ ≥  and  ( ) 0 σ ⋅ > , where 
the parameter  (.) ν  stands for the human capital growth rate and  (.) σ  stands for human capital 
depreciation rate. 
Assumption 8 (prices):  0, 0, 0 st st st B W P > > >  at any point in time. 
Assumption 9 (uniqueness): Consumption and savings are normal goods. 
Assumptions 1 to 9 are necessary requirements to determine the uniqueness of the 
solution to the problem in (2). At any time  t, the only source of uncertainty is next period 
stochastic shocks (Assumption 1). Nature draws at each  [0, ] t T ∈  to reveal the state of the world 
and individuals compare alternative choices at the new state conditional on own preference and 
characteristics to value the opportunity cost among alternative regimes (Assumption 6). A choice 
of labour market and consumption are made by rational agents that maximize a well defined ob- 
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jective conditional on a monotonically changing dynamic state space (Assumptions 2 and 3). 
Excluding leisure from the objective function precludes wealth effects (i.e., backward bending 
labour supply functions), a requirement for a sub-population that may be subject to ALMP. 
Lifetime constrains in assets (Assumption 4) pin down a feasible set of consumption paths from 
which to choose the optimal one. Individuals are allowed to borrow (no liquidity constrains) 
although they are bounded to retire without debt ( 0 iT a ≥ ). At entry point ( 0 t = ) human capital is 
at its lowest (thus the lower bar in 
( ) s i h ), positive and identical among individuals with equal 
skills, while human capital stocks can never be negative, i.e., individuals will always hold some 
skill specific knowledge. Finally, a concave function that goes through the origin allows for 
monotonic changes to the unique solution if exogenous parameters shift the function in particular 
directions (Assumption 5), whereas positive prices and positive human capital parameters 
(Assumptions 7 and 8) also define monotonic conditions for the dynamics in (2). 
3.4  Some properties of the optimisation problem 
Based on the previous formulation, the following intermediate results on model properties 
are obtained (all proofs are relegated to the Appendix): 
Lemma 1 (choice of labour market states): Assumptions 1-8 hold. Given π , an optimal 
choice of labour market regime is characterized by a monotonic labour market reservation policy 
that is determined conditional on each individual’s characteristics at any t  such that, 
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= = =
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Lemma 2 (properties of the value function): Allow for Assumptions 1-8. Then, the ex-
pected value function  ( , , )
s E V a h π π  is strictly increasing, twice differentiable and a concave 
function of a (assets). 
The Bellman representation in (2) shows that a realization  it π  is the only variable that 
implies changes in the state of the world, thus, it is the fundamental determinant of a regime 
choice. But utility comes only from  it c  with labour market choices acting as a ‘conditional’ 
determinant of the optimal consumption path: to obtain this latter is the unique objective of the 
individual, i.e., the solution to the problem in (2) is the optimal consumption path for a given 
regime choice as characterized by an Euler Equation that explains the intertemporal consumption 
rule. The Euler Equation, however, is only a valid characterization if it fulfils the set of regularity 
conditions as determined in Lemmas 1 and 2. Lemma 1 characterizes the working decision and 
interprets the value function as the sum of mutually exclusive value functions, each associated 
with a unique labour market regime over the support of the labour market shocks. Lemma 2 
establishes the continuity, differentiability and concavity of the value function in assets alone. 
Thus, the regularity conditions in Lemma 2 are sufficient and necessary to define optimal 
consumption decisions for fixed labour market conditions as determined by the following 
individual specific Euler Equation: 
1
( ) ( )
| (1 ) |
it it
t it t it
I I
it it





  ∂ ∂
= +   ∂ ∂  
.  (4) 
However, the problem (2) implies a more complex set of dynamics than just assets. The 
Euler  Equation  in  (4)  conditional  on  fixed  labour  market  regimes  is  not  sufficient  to  
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‘characterize’ the consumption decision rule because for a given history of shocks and for a 
given skill class, assets move along with human capital. The combination of the Euler Equation 
in (4) together with Lemma 3 and its proof in Appendix 1 provide an interpretation of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the Euler Equation in (4) to represent the optimal con-
sumption path conditional on given levels of human capital: 
Lemma 3 (Identification of the optimal consumption path). Allow for Assumptions 1-9. 
Then, the Euler Equation in (4) is not sufficient to identify an optimal consumption path, since 
identification further requires that both consumption and savings are normal goods for fixed 
labour market decisions. 
4  Identification and estimation 
Our aim is to use the structural set-up in (1) to provide identifying conditions for the 
parameters underlying human capital formation, namely  (.) υ  and  (.) σ . Once these conditions are 
well specified estimation relies on the use of informative data at the individual level concerning 
labour market choices together with socio-economic background information that provide 
insights into individuals preferences and labour market histories. 
4.1  Specifications by labour market regime 
The structural model in (1) implies three labour market regimes and therefore three sets 
of behavioural conditions leading to the same number of reduced form specifications each of 
which explains the gains (total receipts) from respective labour market choices. We start by 
studying the conditions implied by observing an individual as working.
3 
                                                           
3   All that follows from this point onwards makes constant reference to the individual i with skill level i s , therefore 
we suppress the suffixes ( , ) i s  to simplify the notation.  
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Employment  
From (1), at any time t  a working individual ( 1
w
t I = ) receives skill specific total assets 
t E  equal to  t t t W hπ ɶ  where  (1 ) t t t W W τ = − ɶ  is the average net return from working during t  and  t h  is 
the contribution to total assets from human capital stocks for a given productivity shock  t π .
4 At 
levels the components in  t E  do not provide direct information on  (.) υ . However, the model in 
(1) determines earning’s growth partly as the consequence of human capital growth – i.e., 
, 1 ln ( , ) t t t t h s h υ π +   =  – resulting from working activities over a working spell of at least two 
consecutive periods, that is: 
[ ]
, 1 1
, 1 , 1 1 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
ln ln ln ;
ln ln( ) ln ( ( )) ln ( ( 1)) ln ;
ln ln( ) ( , ) ln .
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
E Wh where E E E
E W h t h t





+ + + +
+ + +
=   = −
⇒   =  + − − + 




  (5) 
Expression (5) shows earning’s growth between periods ( , 1 ln t t E +   ) as the sum of three 
components; skill specific wage growth,  , 1 ln( ) t t W +   ɶ , growth due to idiosyncratic changes in 
human capital,  [ ] 1 ln ( ( )) ln ( ( 1)) t t h t h t π π + − − , and growth due to between periods changes on 
stochastic shocks, [ ] 1 ln ln t t π π + −  where the latter represents stochastic changes in productivity 
gains as direct result of a working spell. Notice that (5) characterizes  t j h +  as determined by 
( 1 ) t j π − + ,  0,1 j =  which does not stand for the stochastic shock  1 t j π − +  but instead characterises 
the labour market history up to the period ( 1 ) t j − + ,  0,1 j = : recall that the stochastic shock is 
what finally determines the state of nature and therefore the choice of regime. If so, the sequence 
of  shocks  up  to  t   have  a  decisive  effect  on  h  at  1 t +   as  emphasised  by  the  notation 
                                                           
4   Following Huggett (1997) the expression allows for human capital to enter multiplicatively towards total receipts 
from labour market activities and it is seen as the efficiency unit’s productive capacity.  
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( ) ( 1 ) t j h t j π + − + ,  0,1 j = , with this latter as the only component in (5) to relate directly to the 
characteristics of the individual, that is, Lemma 1 states that a particular choice depends on the 
individual’s perception of the shock at t  relative to some individual specific reservation level set 
, , ,
R R
t a t b π π    ,  where  the  latter  summarize  the  individual’s  labour  market  preferences.  These 
preferences summarize individual’s characteristics (e.g., household and living conditions, health 
status, age, gender, etc.) as well as labour market history. Thus, characterizing  t j h +  with 
( 1 ) t j π − + ,  0,1 j = , links observed individual specific information in the data to time varying 
unobserved human capital stocks  ( ) ( 1 ) t j h t j π + − + ,  0,1 j = , a link that becomes crucial when 
identifying the two human capital parameters in later sections. The last expression in (5) makes 
use of the dynamics in (1) to explicitly interpret human capital growth at the rate  (.) υ  that varies 
over time as consequence of its dependence on contemporaneous human capital stock;  (.) υ  is a 
key parameter that we aim to estimate for each of the skill classes s . We interpret  ( ) t h υ  as the 
‘skill specific’ ability to learn since in our model ‘learning’ is the only reason for human capital 
to grow between periods. 
Unemployment without ALMP 
Let  t Γ  define any gains at t  for the unemployed without ALMP participation (i.e.,  1
n
t I =  
leads to  t Γ  at t ). The model in (1) implies that  t t t B h Γ =  where  t B  stands for the average receipts 
(e.g., social benefits, social assistance, etc.) for skill class s  at time t  and  t h  are human capital 
stocks at t . Comparing outcomes between  1
w
t I =  and  1
n
t I =  (i.e., comparing  t t t W hπ ɶ  and  t t B h ) 
shows a difference regarding the direct effect of  t π , i.e., unemployed individuals do not 
experience gains in productive capacity implied by the stochastic changes that affect those in 
employment.  Instead,  the  unemployed  without  ALMP  become  subject  to  human  capital  
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depreciation, thus, if  1
n
t I =  the effect of the shock is picked up in full by the human capital stock, 
t h . Following an equal interpretation as for those in employment, the following expressions 
define the change in gains when  1 1
n n
t t I I + = =  is the result of labour market choices over two 
consecutive periods ( , 1) t t + : 
[ ]
, 1 1
, 1 , 1 1
, 1 , 1
ln ln ln ;
ln ln( ) ln ( ( )) ln ( ( 1)) ;
ln ln( ) ( , ) .
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
Bh where







Γ =   Γ = Γ − Γ
⇒  Γ =  + − −
⇒  Γ =  −
  (6) 
Expression (6) explicitly shows the human capital depreciation parameter,  ( ) t h σ , to be 
interpreted as the skill specific loss in learning, since it is this loss (given low or no-contact with 
working environments) that may explain human capital depreciation over time. Of course, the 
negative sign for that rate is a modelling assumption that needs to be empirically verified.
 5 
Unemployment with ALMP  
Expressions (5) and (6) relate observed outcomes to the key parameters of interest,  ( ) t h υ  
and  ( ) t h σ . However, the structural model defines an alternative unemployment regime for 
participants  in  ALMP.  Define  ( ) t t t t B P h   = − ,  where  ( ) t t B P −   describes  unemployment 
insurance ( ) t B  net from the individual specific cost of participating in ALMP ( ) t P
6 for individu-
als with labour market choices such that  1 1
q q
t t I I + = = . From the dynamics of assets in (1) the 
following net gains result: 
                                                           
5   Theoretically, the structural model is only consistent with the underlying assumptions if both  0 σ ≥  and  0 π ≥  
hold . It is the only this combination that implies potential changes between labour market regimes while leaving 
the monotonic condition in Lemma 1 intact.  
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( )
[ ] [ ]
, 1 1
, 1 1 1 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
ln ln ln ;
ln ln( ) ln( ) ln ( ( )) ln ( ( 1)) ;
ln ln( ).
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
B P h where




+ + + +
+ + +
  = −     =   −  
⇒     = − − − + − −
⇒     =  −
  (7) 
Clearly, expression (7) brings no information regarding changes in human capital. 
However, relative to the changes implied in (6), the identity in (7) should provide us with an 
empirical test for the null of no changes in human capital as result ALMP participation. We 
notice that the potentially non-pecuniary value  t P differs for all in population; empirically one 
can only observe the identity  ( ) ( ) 1, 1 ln | 1
q q
t t t t change in remunaration over time I I + +     ≡   = = , but 
it is the assumption that  0 P >  which leads to two distinct choice of unemployment in the labour 
market (see the proof to Lemma 1 in Appendix 1). 
4.2  Identification 
From the structural model in (1) and the two informative conditions (5) and (6), we define 
the following population moment conditions (for any given skill class s , omitted): 
( )
( ) ( )
, 1 1
, 1 1 1 , 1 1
(5), :
ln 1
ln( ) 1 ( ) 1 ln( ) 1 .
w w
t t t t
w w w w w w
t t t t t t t t t t t t
From Employment spells
E E I I
E W I I E h I I E I I υ π π
+ +
+ + + + +
    = = =  






, 1 1 1
(6), & :
ln 1
ln( ) 1 ( ) 1 .
n n
t t t t
n n n n
t t t t t t t t
From Unemployment spells no ALMP
E I I
E B I I E h I I σ π
+ +
+ + +
    Γ = = =  
      = = − = =    
  (8) 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
6   For example,  t P  may be the individual specific monetary cost of attending the course – as is the case of transport 
cost – but can also be thought as the individual’s perceived cost of signalling to the market in the even of taking 
up course within the ALMP range (that is, stigmatization, low ability, etc.)  
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Our final aim is to obtain skill specific estimates for  ( ) t h υ  and  ( ) t h σ  using the sample 
analogues for each of the population conditions in (8) having shown that these are informative 
with regards to human capital formation. The vectors ( ) ( ), t t h υ π  and ( ) ( ), t t h σ π  imply sets of 
random variables dependent on unobserved  t h . Unless we can disentangle the effects between 
( ) t h υ  and  t π , and likewise between  ( ) t h σ  and  t π , we cannot identify the parameter set 
( ) ( ), ( ) t t h h υ σ . Thus, we need to expand our set of assumptions to elicit the effect of  ( ) t h υ  and 
( ) t h σ  away from the idiosyncratic effects that the shock  t π  may have on  ( ) , 1 ln t t E +    and 
( ) , 1 ln t t+   Γ , respectively. Let  t Z  be a set of variables that determines  t h . For example,  t Z  may 
include age and labour market experience (within specific skill class s ). Assume that for each 
value  of  t Z   individual’s  human  capital  is  sufficiently  homogenous  so  that 
1 ( ) | , 1
w w
t t t t t E h Z I I υ π +   = =   =  1 | , 1
w w
t t t t t E Z I I υ π +   = =   , where  ( ) t t s υ υ =  represents the skill specific 
ability to learn. Notice that for an appropriate choice of  t Z  similar arguments would apply to 
those in unemployment spells so that  1 1 ( ) | , 1 | , 1
n n n n
t t t t t t t t t t E h Z I I E Z I I σ π σ π + +     = = = = =     applies. 
With this, define  ( ) , , 1 : , 1
w w
E t E t t t Z I I + Ξ = = =  and  ( ) , , 1 : , 1
n n
t t t t Z I I Γ Γ + Ξ = = = : within each subgroup  , E t Ξ  
(or  ,t Γ Ξ ) the rate of change of  t h  (and  t h  itself) is assumed to be identical even if we cannot 
directly observe such stocks  t h . These arguments lead to the following assumption: 
Assumption 10 (homogeneity in human capital): Within each skill class  s ,  ( ) t h υ  and  ( ) t h σ  
determine human capital changes. Let  , E t Z  and  ,t ZΓ  be observed information defining sub-
groups in the population with homogeneous stocks of human capital  t h . Conditional on mem-
bership in these groups, individual’s human capital stocks are identical between periods, so that  
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both  1 [ ( )| , 1]
w w
t t t t t E h Z I I υ υ + = = =  and  1 [ ( )| , 1]
n n
t t t t t E h Z I I σ σ + = = =
7 apply. 
Assumption 10 implies that υ  and σ  are ‘sub-group constant’ conditional on the infor-
mation set Z  at t  that may be potentially different for different regime choices (i.e., difference in 
information between  , E t Z  and  ,t ZΓ ). Thus, taking expectations over sub-populations defined by 
corresponding vectors of  t Z  solves the problem of unobserved human capital  t h  and Assumption 
10 becomes the key identifying assumption disentangling the effects of  t h  and  t π . With this, the 
following applies to substitute the previous moment conditions: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, 1 , , 1 , , , 1 ,
, 1 , , 1 , ,
ln ln( ) ln( ) ;
ln ln( ) .
t t E t t t E t t t E t t t E t
t t t t t t t t t
E E E W E E




+ Γ + Γ Γ
          Ξ =   Ξ + ⋅ Ξ +   Ξ        
        Γ Ξ =   Ξ − ⋅ Ξ      
ɶ
  (9) 
The moment conditions in (9) cannot directly be used to identify the unknown pa-
rameters, because we do not observe the shocks that determine the expectations  , t E t E π   Ξ  , 
( ) , , 1 , ln( ) s t t E t E π +     Ξ   and  , t t E π Γ   Ξ  . However, we do observe individual’s labour market 
choices that result directly from individual’s comparison of the state of the world (i.e., the 
transitory shock  t π )
8 with their labour reservation policies  [ ]
R
t a π  and  [ ]
R
t b π . In Section 3 it has been 
shown that these policies are functions of both labour market histories and individual’s specific 
characteristics that determine the individual’s labour market choices. Thus, observing  1
w
t I =  at t  
implies  ,[ ]
R
t t b π π ≥ , whereas observing  1
n
t I =  at t  implies  ,[ ]
R
t a t π π ≥ ; for all individuals  [ ] [ ]
R R
t a t b π π <  
                                                           
7   It is not necessary to condition on  1 t Z + , because  t Z  explains human capital stocks at t  for individuals whose 
choice is identical at t  and  1 t + . Therefore, by definition, they experience identical changes in human capital. 
8   The  structural  model  in  (1)  determines  that  the  only  stochastic  component  in  the  state  space  is  the 
contemporaneous and transitory labour market shock. At the beginning of the period the shock is revealed and 
individuals evaluate the state of the world to make an optimal labour market (and consumption) decision. Thus,  
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(see Lemma 1). If we are able to retrieve the reservation values  [ ]
R
t a π  and  [ ]
R
t b π  from the data, they 
would provide one-sided bounding information on the magnitude of the unobserved shocks  t π . 
Furthermore,  Assumption  1  interprets  the  shocks  as  stochastic  draws  from  some  known 
distribution with positive bounded support [ , ] π π , bounds that are otherwise required to establish 
the unique solution to the problem in expression (2) (see Lemma 2). Taking these conditions 




, : 1 .
w R
t t b t
n R
t t t a
Employment I
Unemployment no ALMP I
π π π
π π π
= ⇒ ≤ ≤
= ⇒ ≤ ≤
  (10) 
The conditions in (10) define bounds for the unknown stochastic shocks conditional on a 
given labour market regime in period t , bounds that are consistent with the structural model in 
(1).  These  conditions  imply  that  we  can  identify  , t E t E π   Ξ   ,  ( ) , , 1 , ln( ) s t t E t E π +     Ξ    and 
, t t E π Γ   Ξ   up to an interval if we can use the observed behaviour in the population to identify 
the reservation policies ( [ ]
R
t a π  and  [ ]
R
t b π ) and the two limiting values (π  and π ). Consider only 
regimes  associated  with  changes  in  the  stock  of  human  capital  and  define  the  following 
conditions: 




, [ , ]
, :
: ( 1) ( )
, : ( 1) (
R R
t a t b
t
w R




and for all in the population
Then we define the following unconditional population moment conditions
Employment P I P







= = ≤ ≤
= = ] ).
R
a t π π ≥ ≥
  (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
saying that individuals evaluate the state of the world against the reservation policies ( ,[ ]
R
t a π ) and ( ,[ ]
R
t b π ) is the 
same as suggesting that individuals evaluate the labour market shock against such reservation parameters.  
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Expression (11) needs further structure to become operational. We have a clear difference 
between  the  sets  [ , ] π π   and  [ ,[ ]
R
t a π , ,[ ]
R
t b π ];  whereas  the  limits  [ , ] π π   are  independent  from 
individual’s characteristics (thus identical to all), the reservation values  ,[ ]
R
t a π  and  ,[ ]
R
t b π  are 
heterogeneous and depend on observables representing individual’s preference in the population. 
Let these preferences and characteristics be explained by a set of variables  t Κ  such that 
( ) ,[ ] ,[ ]
R R
t a t a t π π Γ = Κ  and  ( ) ,[ ] ,[ ] ,
R R
t b t b E t π π = Κ  applies.
9 To formalize these relations we specify a 
function that relates the reservation values to the observed characteristics. The function is such 
that for a given  t Κ  set the reservation values are always projected on the positive line, a re-
quirement because the structural model in (1) establishes  ,[ ] ,[ ] 0
R R
t a t b π π π π < < ≤ < < ∞. Thus, we 
chose an exponential relation between the pair  ,[ ] ,[ ] ( , )
R R
t a t b π π  and the information set  t Κ : 
Assumption 11: The following relations hold for every individual in the population: 
( ) ( ) ,[ ] ,[ ] ,[ ] ,[ ] exp exp ln ln .
R R R R
t a t a t b t b t a t a t b t b and and π γ π γ π γ π γ = Κ = Κ ⇒ =Κ =Κ  
The vectors of parameters  a γ  and  b γ  in Assumption 11 are weights that determine the 
importance of each of the variables in  t Κ  with regards to the reservation values (i.e., relative la-
bour market choices). The logarithmic transformation is monotonic thus preserving the relation 
between  the  values  ,[ ] ,[ ] ( , , , )
R R
t a t b π π π π ,  i.e.,  ,[ ] ,[ ] 0 ln ln ln ln
R R
t a t b π π π π < < ≤ < < ∞  preserves 
,[ ] ,[ ] 0
R R
t a t b π π π π < < ≤ < < ∞. At this point we can modify the condition in (11). Observing that for 
                                                           
9   The set  Γ Κ  may differ from  E Κ . These information sets would include all those variables that we may think 
determines the fixed cost for entry into a given labour market regime (e.g., individuals household characteristics, 
motivation, the value of time, etc.) as well as personal characteristics that may explain individual’s preference 
when choosing to participate in the labour market (e.g., assets, debts, family composition, gender, etc).  
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any individual we have that  ,[ ] ,[ ]
R R
t a t b π π < , we obtain the following representation for all shocks in 
the support  [ , ] t π π π ∈ : 
,[ ]
,[ ]
: ( 1) (ln ln ln )
, : ( 1) (ln ln ln ).
w R
t t b t
n R
t t t a
Employment P I P
Unemployment no ALMP P I P
π π π
π π π
= = ≤ ≤
= = ≤ ≤
  (12) 
The structural model in (1) assumes individuals make choices to maximise utility. Thus, 
we assume that labour market choices are governed by an underlying unobserved latent process 
that describes the utility associated with each potential labour market choice conditional on the 
individual’s observed characteristics. What we observe (the actual labour market choice) is the 
outcome of such utility valuation in the form of a realized labour market regime. The following 





: 1 0 ln ln ;
, : 1 0 ln ln .
w w w R
t t t t b t
n n n R
t t t t a t
Employment I I where I
Unemployment no ALMP I I where I
π π
π π
= ⇒ ≥ =− +
= ⇒ ≤ =− +
  (13) 
Applying Assumption 11 to the two second conditions in (13) leads to the following 
probabilities: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
*
: 1| , 0| , ln
, : 1| , 0| , ln .
w w
t t b t t b t t b
n n
t t a t t a t t a
Employment P I P I P
Unemployment no ALMP P I P I P
γ γ π γ
γ γ π γ
= Κ = ≥ Κ = ≥Κ
= Κ = ≤ Κ = ≥Κ
  (14) 
Assumption 11 implies that having estimated the vectors  a γ  and  b γ , we can predict the 
reservation values, i.e.,  ( ) , ˆ ˆ exp
R
t a t a π γ = Κ  and  ( ) , ˆ ˆ exp
R
t b t b π γ = Κ . The latent processes in (13) treat 
the stochastic shocks (ln t π ) as independent error terms summarizing all the stochastic variability 
that adjusts labour market choices to the deterministic preferences ( , ln , ,
R
t l l a b π = ). Moreover, the  
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specifications in (14) – given (13) – justify the use of an index model to estimate the weighting 
vectors ( a γ  and  b γ ) as long as we make some distributional assumptions on the shock ln t π : 
Assumption 12 (characterization of labour market shocks): The productivity shock π  follows a 
truncated lognormal distribution  ( ) , LnN sig π π    in the support [ , ] π π , where  , 0 π π π < > . This 
implies that lnπ  follows a truncated normal distribution  ( ) ln ln , N sig π π    in the support [ln ,ln ] π π , 
where we assume  ln 0 π   = . 
Together with (13) and (14), Assumptions 11 and 12 identify the reservation values 
,[ ] ,[ ] ( , )
R R
t a t b π π  for each individual in the population. The unknown bounds  ( , ) π π  establish the 
truncation of the distribution in Assumption 11 and are estimated jointly with  ,[ ]
R
t a π  and  ,[ ]
R
t b π . 
According to (10), knowledge of  ,[ ] ,[ ] ( , , , )
R R
t a t b π π π π  together with the log-normality assumption 
leads to identification of  , t E t E π   Ξ  ,  ( ) , , 1 , ln( ) s t t E t E π +     Ξ   and  , t t E π Γ   Ξ   so that the parameters 
t υ  and  t σ  are also identified from (9). Point identification of these parameters is possible if we 
assume mean values of the intervals in (10) to represent individual’s unobserved stochastic 
shocks. 
4.3  Estimation 
Assumption 12 imposes that  ( ) ln ln ~ 0, t N π π σ , thus we estimate the vectors  a γ  and  b γ  
(up  to  scale)  at  distinct  times  , 0,1 t j j + =   using  probit  models  with  dependent  variable 
1, 0,1
w
t j I j + = = , (against  1, 0,1
w
t j I j + ≠ = , respectively) conditional on  , 0,1
w
t j j + Κ = , and for the 
outcome  1, 0,1
n
t j I j + = =  (against  0, 0,1
n
t j I j + = = , respectively) conditional on  , 0,1
n
t j j + Κ = , with  
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obvious suffix for the information sets.
10 In estimating the probit models we allow for the 
distribution function of the error term to be truncated from both the left and right hand side. 
Thus, for every time period t and employment state, the likelihood function conditional on 
employment state is defined as follows:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )




: 1 0 1| ;
ln ln
1| ; & 1| ;
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
| , , .




t t t t b
t b t b w w
t t b t t b
I I
t b t b
b t N
Employment I I P I
P I P I
L
γ
π γ γ π
γ γ
π π π π
π γ γ π
γ π π
π π π π
= ≠
= ⇒ ≥ = Κ
    Φ −Φ Κ Φ Κ −Φ
⇒ = Κ = ≠ Κ =         Φ −Φ Φ −Φ    
    Φ −Φ Κ Φ Κ −Φ
⇒ Κ =         Φ −Φ Φ −Φ     ∏
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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( ) ( )
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1
, : 1 0 1| ;
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1| ; & 1| ;
ln ln ln ln
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| , ,




t t t t a
t a t a n n
t t a t t a
I I
t a t a
a t N
Unemployment no ALMP I I P I
P I P I
L
γ
γ π π γ
γ γ
π π π π
γ π π γ
γ π π
π π π π
=
= ⇒ ≤ = Κ
    Φ Κ −Φ Φ −Φ Κ
⇒ = Κ = ≠ Κ =         Φ −Φ Φ −Φ    
    Φ Κ −Φ Φ −Φ Κ






In expression (15) the index  1
j
t I ≠  stands for the alternative labour market regime to 
choice  j, Φ is the cumulative density function from the standard normal distribution and  N  
defines a random sample representative of the underlying population. The bounds ( , ) π π  are not 
included in the parameter space so that the likelihood function is given as  ( ) | , , t L γ π π Κ i  instead 
of  ( ) , , | t L γ π π Κ i . Allowing for the set  ( , ) π π  to enter the parameter space turned out to be 
numerically unstable: the information matrix would depend on the cross derivatives ( ) γ π ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
( ) γ π ∂ ∂ ∂   and  ( ) π π ∂ ∂ ∂   entering  as  off  diagonals.  It  is  now  easy  to  show  that 
                                                           
10  It would be misleading to index the reservation values  ,
R
t n π  and  ,
R
t w π  as opposed to the established indexes  ,
R
t a π  
and  ,
R
t b π : the suffixes [ , ] a b  clearly indicate that irrespective of market choice ( , ) w n , all individuals at each 
point in time hold a pair of reservation values to identify their three distinct labour market valuations, ( , , ) w n q .  
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( ) ( ) 0 E E γ π γ π ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ = . At the same time, the second derivatives 
2 ( ) π π ∂ ∂ ∂  and ( ) π π ∂ ∂ ∂  as 
well as ( ) π π ∂ ∂ ∂  rely multiplicatively on the values of the probability density functions  (ln ) φ π  
and  (ln ) φ π  that can be arbitrarily close to zero for small changes in ( , ) π π  as the process iterates 
towards the maximum. Thus, the information matrix becomes singular very fast for small 
changes in  ( , ) π π . As an alternative estimation procedure, we fix the values  ( , ) π π  since the 
likelihood  function  is  well  specified  for  given  values  ( , ) π π ,  i.e.,  the  bounding  intervals 
systematically shift the likelihood function but leave the properties of the maximum likelihood 
estimates of  a γ  and  b γ  intact. We choose the set 
* * ( , ) π π  and the resulting 
mle
a γ  (or 
mle
b γ ) such that 
the pair 
* * ( , ) π π  implies the highest estimated value of the likelihood function among a finite 
number of ( , ) π π  pairs (see Section 6 for further details). 
Once the values 
* * ( , ) π π  and the pair 
mle
a γ  and 
mle
b γ  are estimated from the data reservation 
values  ( ) , ˆ exp
R n
t a t a π γ = Κ   and  ( ) , ˆ exp
R n
t b t b π γ = Κ   are  also  identified  and,  therefore,  so  is  the 
distribution of the unobserved shocks  t π . With these, the conditional expectations  , t E t E π   Ξ  , 
( ) , , 1 , ln( ) s t t E t E π +     Ξ   and  , t t E π Γ   Ξ   are approximated using their sample analogues such that 




N it E t i π
= Ξ ∑ ɶ ,  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 , 1 ln ln |
N




N it t i π Γ = Ξ ∑ ɶ , where  it π ɶ  is the 
midpoint of the interval in (10) for the individual i .
11 With this all the elements in expression (9) 
are identified and sample analogues to the population conditions in (9) can be used to estimate 
the key human capital parameters  t υ  and  t σ . Inference from the sample to the population is 
possible using a bootstrap procedure that re-samples randomly from the data with replacement 
                                                           
11  Note that although the midpoint of the interval is an inconsistent estimator if the interval is not symmetric around 
the truncated mean, it provides a computationally convenient and fast approximation.  
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(i.e., a naïve bootstrap) to obtain intervals as given in (10) for each bootstrap sample (see Section 
6 for more details on the full bootstrap estimation process). 
5  Data 
We use 13 waves from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SAKE, 1991 – 2004) to em-
pirically quantify human capital growth and depreciation rates. The Swiss Labour Force Survey 
is a 5 year rotating panel that collects information from a representative sample of working age 
individuals (ages 16 and above) living in Switzerland. Questions in the panel refer to labour 
market outcomes, extensive cover of labour market histories and key socio-economic indicators. 
Between the start of the panel in 1991 and 2004, 152,010 distinct individuals have participated. 
In practice, estimating (9) requires only two consecutive waves. Using all 13 waves 
increases the sample size within each of the three sub-samples (i.e., in spells of employed, 
unemployment with and unemployment without ALMP) while allowing to control for time de-
pendent macro-economic changes. The 13 waves determine at most 12 sets of consecutive years 
, 1 t t + .  Thus,  individuals  may  appear  as  repeated  units  in  our  data  set.
12  Such  repeated 
observations from an individual at different intervals ( , 1) t t +  count as distinct units due to chang-
ing labour market histories that contribute differently over time towards distinct human capital 
sub-cells.  
Assumption 10 requires selecting units of working age (16 to 65). To attain a homo-
geneous sample regarding the implication of active and passive labour market policies, our 
sample criteria consists of selecting non-disabled males, full time workers if employed or, in the 
                                                           
12  Because of the 5-year rotating nature of the panel, an individual can appear (at most) 5 consecutive times, while 
leaving the panel at any time before years 5 implies not being surveyed any more in the future. By definition an 
individual that completes the 5 years may appear at most 4 times as a unit observed at t  and at  1 t + .   
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case of the unemployed, they claimed to have worked full time in their last employment. All 
selected individuals declare to have finished their formal education and are Swiss or foreigners 
with have a permanent working permit. Furthermore, individuals with a working status at  t  
( 1 t + ) are selected only if they also claim a working status at  1 t −  (t ) to further ensure 
Assumption 10, i.e., individual with similar human capital stocks must have similar labour 
market  histories.  Conditioning  on  employment  at  1 t −   (t )  for  those  working  at  t   ( 1 t − ) 
guarantees that the human capital stock of those in current employment has not been affected by 
unemployment histories in the most recent past.
13 To estimate the parameters in (9) we need to 
consider  only  the  two  main  sub-samples,  i.e.,  consecutively  employed  and  consecutively 
unemployed  without  ALMP.  However,  estimating  index  models  as  in  (14)  requires 
counterfactual outcomes defined at t  independently of the outcome one period ahead. We take 
this into account when selecting the sample (see Table 1).  
Our analysis considers three distinct skill groups defined by pre-labour market education. 
The lowest skill class ( 1 s = ) has not finished compulsory education with a degree (either primary 
or secondary). The next lowest skill class ( 2 s = ) is composed of individuals who have finished 
up to secondary education and may have completed some complementary vocational education 
(e.g., apprenticeship or low 1
st tear vocational college). They have not completed high school 
(Matura). The third and final skill class ( 3 s = ) are medium-skill individuals with completed high 
school or equivalent and include those with 2
nd tier vocational college. We exclude individuals 
with university or higher technical college (either case, completed or otherwise) because they are 
unlikely to be part of the ALMP system and thus we won't observe any reasonable numbers in 
the respective cells. Skill class is determined at t . 
                                                           
13  We apply this criteria only to individuals at least 19 years old at t  ( 1 t + ), because individuals who are 16 to 18 
at time t  may still complete their start up education at time  1 t − .  
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The sub-group  1 1
w w
t t I I + = =  in full-time work can easily be identified in the data. The data 
also distinguishes the ‘unemployed’ (registered at official unemployment offices) from the ‘not 
employed’ (those claiming a non-working status while being of working age). The unemployed 
enter the sub-group  1 1
q q
t t I I + = =  if observed consecutively over any two periods. The not-
employed make up the pool from which to draw our unemployed without ALMP, i.e., those in 
1 1
n n
t t I I + = = . However, instead of selecting everyone in this pool, we select units to guarantee that 
members in  1 1
n n
t t I I + = =  have sufficiently low latent reservation wages so that working in the 
future is highly likely. This is done by including units who are not registered as unemployed,
14 
but search or/and claim willingness to work immediately if offered work in short notice. 
Furthermore, since the subgroups help to measure human capital depreciation we require from all 
individuals to have some labour market history. In all, these restrictions in the pool of ‘not-
employed’ implies a substantial cut in the size of the sample but guarantees the non-selection of 
true outsiders to the labour market. It is important to note that in this set-up we treat the regular 
services by the case workers as ALMP as well (contrary to some conventional definitions). 
                                                           
14  The SAKE includes information on the elapse of the benefit period. We use this variable when available. More 
regular information involves asking the unemployed about their status as registered or not. If not registered, they 
should declare intensity of job search and willingness to work if offered work immediately.  
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Table 1: Distribution of consecutively observed units between  , 1 t t +  among alternative la-
bour market regimes 
State in period t  State in period t+1  Observations 
Working  1 ( 1)
w
t I + =   42,438 
Registered unemployed   1 ( 1)
q
t I + =   545 
Unemployed without ALMP  1 ( 1)
n
t I + =   607 




t I =  
 
45,826 
Total  45,826 
Working  1 ( 1)
w
t I + =   322 
Registered unemployed  1 ( 1)
q
t I + =   236 
Unemployed without ALMP  1 ( 1)
n
t I + =   128 




t I =  
 
980 
Total:  980 
Working  1 ( 1)
w
t I + =   264 
Registered Unemployed 1 ( 1)
q
t I + =   97 
Unemployed without ALMP  1 ( 1)
n
t I + =   585 





t I =  
 
1,847 
Total  1,857 
Note:  Full time workers ages 19 or more at t  must declared to have worked for pay during all last calendar year (i.e., during 
the last 12 months). The same selection condition applies to full time workers at  1 t + . Registered unemployed claim 
to be officially registered as unemployed. Unemployed without ALMP are not officially registered but indicate 
willingness to take up work immediately if offered the right vacancy. 
There are 56,390 males observed at least once during the period 1991-2004. They are all 
candidates at t  to become units observed between t  and  1 t + . Applying our selection criteria 
reduces the number of (unique) individuals to 24,041. These individuals make 48,653 distinct 
contributions observed consecutively between t  and  1 t + . Each of the 24,041 can appear at most 
4 times.
15 Table 1 shows the distribution of these units by regime and the changing distribution of 
these among regimes one period ahead. 
                                                           
15  11,352 distinct individuals appear only once between t  and  1 t + , and leave the panel after two years; 5,181 
participate over three consecutive years and contribute as two distinct units between different t  and  1 t + ; 3,093 
determine three distinct units between t  and  1 t + , and 4,415 determine four distinct units between t  and  1 t +  
having participated in the panel for the full 5 years term.  
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Estimates based on (9) require two mutually exclusive groups: those classified as working 
1 ( 1)
w w
t t I I + = =  (42,438) and those classified as non-working-non-ALMP  1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =  (585). Table 
2 shows the distribution of these two groups and the group  1 ( 1)
q q
t t I I + = =  by skill class, because 
skill, together with the idiosyncratic labour market shock, is the key variable that defines 
heterogeneity of human capital formation conditional on human capital stocks. 
Table 2: Distribution of skill class by  1 ( 1)
w w
t t I I + = = ,  1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =  and  1 ( 1)
q q
t t I I + = =  
  Skill class 1 (lowest 
skill) 
( 1) s =  
Skill class 2 (sec-
ond lowest skill) 
( 2) s =  
Skill class 3 (me-
dium skill) ( 3) s =  
Working Spell  1 ( 1)
w w
t t I I + = =   4,974  24,781  12,683 
Registered unemployed spell  1 ( 1)
q q
t t I I + = =   66  117  53 
Unemployed without ALMP spell  1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =   228  190  167 
Mixed spells and/or outsiders at  1 t +   1,174  2,795  1,445 
Total   6,445   27,883  14,335 
Skill class % based on unique individuals   
  1 ( 1)
w w
t t I I + = =   13.8%  56.0%  30.2% 
  1 ( 1)
q q
t t I I + = =   36.9%  39.8%  23.3% 
  1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =   45.0%  24.1  31.0% 
  Percentage of total  16.3%  54.1%  29.6% 
Note:   Skill class is identical over the two periods. The last 4 rows show the distribution by sub-groups for each skill class with 
each of the rows adding up to 100%. 
Section 4 defines two sets of observables;  t Ζ  with variables that help to proxy for human 
capital stocks at t , and  t Κ , the set of variables that determines individual’s preferences (utility) 
regarding a labour market choice. The SAKE provides information to construct the two sets. 
With obvious notation, we define  ,
E
t t Z
Γ Ζ  and  ,
w n
t t Κ Κ  to clarify difference in sets according to the 
two main sub-groups included in (9).
16 Variables that appear in 
w
t Κ  and 
n
t Κ  are age (and age 
                                                           
16  The difference in subscript (i.e., ( , ) E Γ  for sets Z , and ( , ) w n  for sets Κ ) indicate that these sets are used for 
populations defined according regime choices over different lengths. An employed (unemployed) individual over 
consecutive periods provides information for the set 
E
t Ζ  ( t Z
Γ ), whereas choosing a regime at t  or  1 t +  is based 
on preferences  , 0,1; ,
choice
t j j choice n w + Κ = =  irrespective of next periods spell.  
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square), cantonal dummies (Germanic, French or Italian cantons), household size, marital status, 
household ownership, most recent industrial sector (primary, secondary or tertiary), skill class 
(skill class 1, or 2 or 3), the natural log of net real household income, dummy variables to 
indicate the length of the most recent labour market experience (up to 6 months, between 6 
months and 1 year, 1 to 1.5 years, 1.5 to 2 years, 2 to 4 years, 4 to 6 years and more than six 
years), and time dummies for each year between 1991 and 2004. Beside these, 
n
t Κ  includes 
information on unemployment duration (i.e., currently unemployed for at most 6 months, 
unemployed 6 to 12 months, 12 to 18 months, 18 to 24 months and unemployed for 24 months or 
more). The variables in 
E
t Ζ  and  t Z
Γ  allow to divide any sub-group according to homogeneity in 
unobserved human capital stocks  t h . The set 
E
t Ζ  contains age and the same dummies explaining 
labour market experience as defined in 
w
t Κ : further we recall that all 42,438 units of workers 
have worked continuously for one year before being observed at t . Conditional on skill class, 
dividing the sub-group of workers among cells with a similar age and similar experience 
increases within cell homogeneity of human capital, i.e., within cell by skill class, the rate of 
change in human capital (i.e., υ ) is similar (Assumption 10). The set  t Z
Γ  does not contain age: 
instead, it allows for labour market experience but most importantly it contains duration of 
current unemployment spells. It is assumed that individuals with similar experience (before 
becoming unemployed) in the labour market have similar rates of human capital depreciation if 
they have experienced similar lengths of unemployment.   
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Table 3: 
w
t Κ  and 
n
t Κ  by labour market regime choice 
Period t   Period  1 t +    
VARIABLES  1
w




















t I + =  
(1,320) 
Age  41 (11)  38 (13)  37 (17)  42 (11)  39 (13)  43 (17) 
German Canton  .70 (.002)  .59 (.016)  .59 (.011)  .69 (.002)  .60 (.015)  .61 (.013) 
French Canton  .24 (.002)  .34 (.015)  .31 (.011)  .24 (.002)  .32 (.015)  .30 (.012) 
Household size  2.8 (1.4)  2.6 (1.4)  2.8 (1.4)  2.8 (1.4)  2.5 (1.4)  2.6 (1.3) 
Partner present at home  .64 (.002)  .42 (.016)  .33 (.011)  .65 (.002)  .46 (.015)  .46 (.013) 
Household owner  .37 (.002)  .15 (.011)  .33 (.011)  .39 (.002)  .18 (.012)  .35 (.012) 
Primary industry  .05 (.001)  .03 (.006)  .02 (.003)  .05 (.001)  .04 (.006)  .03 (.005) 
Secondary industry  .37 (.002)  .69 (.015)  .68 (.011)  .37 (.002)  .67 (.015)  .66 (.012) 
Labour market experience  













     6 - 12 months  .01 (.0001)  .02 (.005)  .03 (.004)  .007 (.000)  .016 (.004)  .018 (.004) 
  1 - 2 years  .02 (.001)  .03 (.006)  .02 (.003)  .011 (.001)  .018 (.005)  .026 (.005) 
  2 - 4 years  .03 (.001)  .09 (.009)  .04 (.005)  .03 (.001)  .066 (.008)  .040 (.005) 
  4 - 6 years  .04 (.001)  .09 (.009)  .04 (.004)  .038 (.001)  .058 (.007)  .030 (.005) 
  > 6 years  .89 (.001)  .63 (.015)  .32 (.011)  .901 (.001)  .70 (.014)  .39 (.013) 
Unemployment duration  













  6 - 12 months  --  .24 (.013)  .18 (.009)  --  .22 (.013)  .21 (.011) 
  12 - 18 months  --  .18 (.010)  .08 (.006)  --  .14 (.011)  .098 (.008) 
  18 - 24 months  --  .08 (.008)  .07 (.006)  --  .08 (.008)  .071 (.007) 
  > 24 months  --  .00 (.00)  .20 (.009)  --  .00 (.00)  .21 (.011) 
Note:  Most of the variables are part of the probit models (see Appendix). Monetary quantities are in year 2000 CHF. All 
variables relating to spells are binary. Variables in 
w
t Κ  omit unemployment duration whereas variables in 
n
t Κ  include 
them. Bracketed numbers are standard deviations. 
Table 3 shows sample statistics for the variables in 
w
t Κ  and 
n
t Κ  according to labour mar-
ket regimes. Table 4 does the same for 
E
t Ζ  and  t Z
Γ . Both tables include information for the sub-
group  1
q
t I =  or  1 1
q
t I + =  as well.  
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Table 4: 
E
t Ζ  and  t Z








t t I I + = =  
(42,438) 
Unemployment 
spells with ALMP 
1 ( 1)
q q
t t I I + = =  
(236) 
Unemployment. 
Spells, no ALMP  
1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =  
(585) 
Age  41.37 (10.74)  40.5 (13.02)  37.10 (16.77) 
Labour market experience below 6 months  .007 (.0004)  .097 (.019)  .62 (.02) 
       6 to 12 months  .007 (.0004)  .021 (.009)  .014 (.005) 
      12 to 24 months  .013 (.0006)  .034 (.012)  .026 (.007) 
      more than 2 years  .97 (.0008)  .85 (.020)  .34 (.020) 
Unemployment duration below 6 months  --  .60 (.032)  .43 (.020) 
      6 to 12 months  --  .29 (.03)  .17 (.015) 
      12 to 18 months  --  .064 (.016)  .051 (.009) 
      18 to 24 months  --  .047 (.014)  .038 (.008) 
      more than 24 months  --  .00 (.00)  .32 (.019) 
Note:  The statistics relate to period t . Since all individuals described in this table chose identical regimes between periods, 
changes from the information set  t Z  to  1 t Z +  are identical for all individuals. See also note below Table 3. 
Other observed variables required by our analysis are net yearly earnings for working 
observations and net receipts for the unemployed observations. Working individuals are asked 
about labour earnings while all individuals should declare total net household’s income. The 
latter is an important variable because the SAKE is such that for the non-working net household 
income is the information to approximate net income receipts. Thus,  , s t B  is approximated by 
estimating per capita net real household income. In principle, this could include incomes that are 
not associated with benefit receipts (e.g., capital income), but we are dealing with a population 
with relatively low skills who claim a strong willingness to work while being unemployed. Thus, 
it is more likely that the net per capita income of these individuals reflects benefits receipts (e.g., 
family  allowance,  social  assistance,  etc.)  that  capture  the  individual’s  ability  to  survive 
economically while in unemployment. As it is common in survey data, all monetary quantities in 
the SAKE data are subject to response problems: whereas non-response is a larger problem for 
the sub-group of unemployed (approximately 20% of these do not declare household incomes) 
non-response for the working sub-group is less of a problem (4.6% do not declare labour  
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income). We use the classic Mahalanobis imputation procedure (see Rubin, 1987) to impute 
missing money values using the respondents as support information for the non-respondents.  




Employment spells  1 ( 1)
w w
t t I I + = =  
(42,438) 
UE spells without ALMP  1 ( 1)
n n
t t I I + = =  
(585) 
  t   1 t +   t   1 t +  
Net annual labour earnings 
Group Average 
Skill Class 1  
Skill Class 2  















Net annual per capita household 
income 
Group Average 
Skill Class 1  
Skill Class 2  

























Note:  Information on labour earnings is only available for individuals classified as working. About 10% of the sample is 
affected by non-response for earnings and income variables. Net annual per capita household income equals net 
household income divided by the square root of household size. See also comments in Table 3. 
Table 5 shows that net receipts increases on average by 6% in real terms. The increase, 
however, differs by skills with earnings of skill class  1 s =  experiencing a real increase of 4% 
while skill class  3 s =  experience a real earnings increase of 7%.
17 
6  Results 
This section presents estimates for the parameters  t υ  and  t σ  according to cells defined by 
(
E
t Ζ , t Z
Γ ), as explained in Section 5. Before hand, we need to follow a sequence of intermediate 
steps to obtain estimates for  ,[ ] , ,
R
t a π π π  and  ,[ ]
R
t b π . 
                                                           
17 We notice that those who work in Skill classes 1 and 2 receive per capita net income below their net labour 
earnings. This outcome may be the result of normalizing net household income by the square root of household 
size: lower skills households may include lower numbers of individual contributing with earnings towards total 
net household income.  
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As a first step we use Assumption 11 and expression (15) to elicit estimates of  ,[ ]
R
t b π ,  ,[ ]
R
t a π  
for a given choice of π  and π  (see Section 4.3). Allowing for a combination [ , ] π π  in (15), 
where  0, , π π π π > < < ∞ leads to the maximum likelihood estimates  ˆb γ  and  ˆa γ .
18 The vectors 
ˆb γ  and  ˆa γ  (either at t  or  1 t + ) are associated with respective values of the likelihood function. 
Allowing for all possible combinations of [ , ] π π  results in two vectors of estimated values for the 
likelihood functions, one for each of the conditional outcomes  ( 1|.)
w
t P I =  and  ( 1|.)
n
t P I = ; each 
vector has a dimension equal to the number of possible [ , ] π π  combinations. For each of the 
outcomes  ( 1|.)
w
t P I =  and  ( 1|.)
n
t P I =  we chose the combined pair 
* * [ , ] π π  implying the highest 
value of the likelihood function: but the true and unknown [ , ] π π  values are the same for all in 
the  population  (see  Assumption  1,  Lemma  1  and  Assumption  12).  Thus,  we  choose  the 
truncation points such that  ( ) ( ) { }
** ** * * * * [ , ] min , ,max , n w n w π π π π π π = . This procedure results in values 
** 0.000001 π =  and 
** 23.8(0.15) π = , where the bracketed number is a standard error.
19 
                                                           
18  With two time periods, the full set of results implies four vectors, namely, ( , ˆb t γ , , 1 ˆb t γ + ) and ( , ˆa t γ , , 1 ˆa t γ + ). The 
reason why these are not the same for distinct time periods is because of potential regime changes of the 
population between periods t  and  1 t + , a change that is reflected in the sample distribution shown in Table 1. 
19  We grid-search in a selected region starting with combinations in the two dimension region defined such that 
(0.00001,30] π ∈  and  (0.001,30] π ∈  if the condition π π <  applies, i.e., we take combinations in the lower 
triangular part of the two dimensional grid. Assuming initial equidistant increments of 0.5 our search starts with 
1,740 combinations. We choose the value 30 because  (ln30) Φ  is sufficiently close to one. Using the two 
distinct time periods as defined in Table 1, our initial search determines that 
** ** [ , ] π π  can be approximated with 
the values [0.000001, 24.0], since 
** **
1 [ , ]
w
t or t π π + =[0.000001; 3.0] and 
** **
1 [ , ]
n
t or t π π + =[0.03; 23.0]. From this 
initial estimate we fix the lower limit to be 0.000001 (thus there is no standard error associated with this value) 
and let the value for π  vary from 1 to 25, this time in steps of 0.2 to end up with a choice for 23.8. This last grid-
search procedure is performed using only the individuals in the sub-groups  1
n
t I =  and  1 1
n
t I + = , since these are 
the sub-groups providing the highest value of the upper bound in the  ( ) ( ) { }
** ** * * * * [ , ] min , ,max , n w n w π π π π π π =  
step. The standard error for the upper bounds is based on a naïve bootstrap procedure with 500 replications that  
  38 
The upper and lower limits 
** ** [ , ] π π  enter expression (15) as limiting values in the trun-
cated likelihood functions leading to estimates of the vectors  , , 1 ˆ ˆ , b t b t γ γ +  and  , , 1 ˆ ˆ , a t a t γ γ + , where the 
1 ,
w w
t t+ Κ Κ  and  1 ,
n n
t t+ Κ Κ  are the covariates underlining the respective probit specifications (see Table 
3). The complete results of these probit can be found in the appendix. Table 6 shows means and 
variance for the resulting projections of the time dependent reservation values. 
Table 6: Summary statistics for the projected reservation values  
  WORKING   UNEMPLOYED 
  Reservation value 
for employed at 
time t :  
, ˆ
R
t b π   
Reservation value 
for employed at 
time  1 t + :  
1, ˆ
R
t b π +  
Reservation value 
for unemployed at 
time t :  
, ˆ
R
t a π   
Reservation value 
for unemployed at 
time  1 t + :  
1, ˆ
R
t a π +  
Full Population at t  or at  1 t +    mean / std =.19 / .24 
min / max = .02 / 8.6 
mean / std = .17 / .16 
min / max = .022 / 5.5 
mean / std = .15 / .41 
min / max = .010 / 17 
mean / std = .13 / .28 




t t I I + = =  or 
1 1, 1
n n
t t I I + = =    mean / std = .16 / .12 
min / max = .02 / 2.4 
mean / std = .16 / .11 
min / max = .02 / 2.7 
mean / std  = 1.0 / 1.3 
min / max = .02 / 7.6 
mean / std = .89 / 1.0 
min / max = .043 / 6.7 
Note:  See note on previous tables.  
The reservation values  , , 1, 1, , , ,
R R R R
t a t b t a t b π π π π + +  indicate individual’s preferences with regards 
to alternative labour market regimes. But ‘ , , 1, 1, , , ,
R R R R
t a t b t a t b π π π π + + ’ are only meaningful in relative 
terms. For example, we can compare the relative value of the option ‘work’ for the subgroup 
1 1, 1
w w
t t I I + = =  between periods t  and  1 t + : The second row in Table 6 shows that relative to the 
first period, on average, the mean reservation value that describes the sub-groups reservation 
threshold has decreased from 0.163 to 0.158 thus, working at t  increases both assets and human 
capital and working tomorrow becomes less risky, thus the reduced value in the reservation 
policy. These estimates are consistent with Assumption 6 and the conditions for Lemma 2. 
Individual’s reservation values (i.e.,  , 1, ˆ ˆ ,
R R
it b it b π π +  and  , 1, ˆ ˆ ,
R R
it a it a π π + ) joint with 
** 0.000001 π =  
and 
** 23.8 π =  identify the intervals in (10) for each unit in Table 1. Thus, applying Assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
re-samples with replacement from the original data. This bootstrap procedure is part of the overall bootstrap  
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it it a π π π + ≤ ≤   for  the  unemployed  without  ALMP.  We  approximate  each  individual’s 
idiosyncratic shock  it π  by  it π ɶ , the midpoint value for each of the constructed intervals. Table 7 
shows the resulting means and variances. 
Now we estimate the parameters  t υ  and  t σ  from expression (9) using within skill class 
sub-cells determined by the information in Table 4 (i.e., variables in  Ζ-vectors described in 
Section 5). Although defining cells is subjective, our definitions group individuals with similar 
potential for human capital changes (growth and depreciation). Table 8 shows the estimates of 
human capital growth  t υ  based on sub-cells by skills in the sub-group  1 1, 1
w w
t t I I + = = . Table 9 
shows estimates of human capital depreciation  t σ  based on sub-cells defined by the sub-sample 
1 1, 1
n n
t t I I + = = . Each cell estimate is based on the sample analogue for respective expressions in 
(9), where  ( ) , 1 , , 1 , 1 1 1 1 ˆ( | ) 1 ln ln ln
N w N w N w
Et it t s t t it t i i i s N E W υ π
∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + = = =
  Ξ =   −   −     ∑ ∑ ∑ ɶ ɶ  / ( ) 1 1
N w
it i N π
∈
= ∑ ɶ , 
while  ( ) , , 1 , , 1 1 1 ˆ( | , ) 1/ ln ln
N n N n
i t t s t t i i s t N B σ
∈ ∈
Γ + + = =
  Ξ = −   Γ −     ∑ ∑  /  ( ) 1 1
N n
it i N π
∈
= ∑ ɶ  estimate human 
capital growth and depreciation, respectively. In both cases  type Ξ  explains cell-division by  type Ζ  
for given time period t  and skill class s . 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
procedure that aims at eliciting the final parameters.  
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Table 7: Means and variances for the projected reservation shocks ( 1 , t t π π + )  
 
 
Mean value of the approximation for the 
stochastic shock at time t  
Mean value of the approximation for the 
stochastic shock at time  1 t +  
  1
w
t I =   1
q
t I =   1
n
t I =   1 1
w
t I + =   1 1
q
t I + =   1 1
n
t I + =  
Full sample  12.00 (.066)  .500 (.76)  .83 (.96)  11.98 (.058)  .49 (.60)  .80 (.70) 
Skill Class 1  12.03 (.099)  .821 (.90)  .97 (.90)  12.02 (.087)  .55 (.62)  .73 (.60) 
Skill Class 2  11.97 (.061)   .510 (.76)  .76 (.89)   11.97 (.052)  .45 (.70)  .60 (.65) 
Skill Class 3  11.98 (.060)  .550 (.85)  1.10 (.95)  11.98 (.052)  .45 (.60)  .73 (.54) 
1 1, 1
w w
t t I I + = =   12.02 (.059)  00.00 (.000) 
1 1, 1
n n
t t I I + = =   1.21 (.91)  .00 (.00) 
Note:  Individual specific stochastic shocks for the employed and the unemployed (without ALMP) are approximated by the 
midpoints of the intervals. Approximating to the shock for the sub-sample  1
q
t I =   is based on the midpoint of the inter-
val  , , ˆ ˆ
R R
t a t t b π π π < < . Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Table 8 presents estimates based on the number of units as given in the first row for each 
of the cells. They help to understand how human capital grows. The values within each cell are 
cell-wise estimates for  υ , based on the gradient in the relation  ( ) 1 ln it it it h h υπ + = , that is, 
( ) 1 , ln
E t t t h h υπ + Ξ = ɶ  or  ( ) ( ) 1 , exp
E t t t h h υπ + Ξ = ɶ . According to the structural model  υ  should be 
positive. Table 8 shows although some negative values occur they are extremely small and not 
statistically significant.
20 Indeed, Table 8 shows that despite the positive sign for most cells, only 
few estimates are significantly different than zero. In terms of magnitudes, the values suggest 
that while working, growth rates are larger during earlier stages in the lifecycle. 
                                                           
20  Significance is based on the already mentioned bootstrap procedure. The actual estimates for υ  are based on 
applying expressions (9) and having fixed the lower limit to 0.000001 and the upper limit to 23.8. For sampling 
variance we still fix the lower interval to 0.000001 and allow for the upper limit to be determined freely based on 
the sample selected with replacement (always using an interval close to 23.8 and in steps of 0.2 as previously 
described). The bootstrap estimate for the upper limit is used to estimate the probit outcomes as defined in (15) 
where these are also estimated allowing for the bootstrap sample to obtain the reservation values, and with this 
the intervals in (10). The bootstrap sample for the parameters υ  (and likewise σ ) follow straightforwardly from 
(9). At each step intermediate values from bootstraps re-samples are kept and these are later used to estimate 
standard errors given in Tables 6 to 9 (some cells are too small in size to be used for inference).  
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Table 8 to be continued  
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Note:  Estimates in classes with less than 10 observations are not shown. The first row in each cell shows the units in the cell. 
The second row in any cell shows the estimate of υ  for that cell with bootstrap standard errors in brackets. The last 
row within each cell is the mean value of the shock per cell (i.e., the mean  t π ɶ  within cell). Values significant at the 5% 
level are bold. 
For example, in skill class 3 human capital grows at 0.2% for low experience (less than 6 
months) and age bracket 26-30. Moving to more than 6 months of experience and older workers 
(31-40) human capital grows at a rate 0.13%. Once we move to older ages and more experience 
(i.e., one to two years or more than two years, and ages 41 to 50 or more than 50) the magnitudes 
of human capital growth (0.01% and 0.04%) suggest that individuals are already at the flat 
section of their concave human capital curve. 
Table 9 shows the estimates for the human capital depreciation rates. We display these 
values such that a positive value implies a negative estimate. The partition within cells is based 
on experience and unemployment duration at the present spell of unemployment. The partitions 
displayed in Table 9 are the finest partitions possible; allowing more sub-cells would lower the 
size of the units within each cell considerably while leaving other cells empty. As with rates of 
growth, we interpret these parameters as the gradient in a function explaining the human capital 
change (depreciation rates) between consecutive periods such that ( ) ( ) 1 , exp t t t h h σπ + ΞΓ = − ɶ . Most  
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of the cells provide estimates consistent with our model, while estimates with negative signs 
(there are only 3 such values) are not statistically different from zero. 
Table 9: Estimates of σ  by cells with common human capital stocks and skill class  
Unemployment duration  
in months 
Experience in the labour 
market below or equal to 2 
years 
Experience in the labour 
market greater than 2 years 












between 19 – 24 months  N/A  N/A 




1 s =  
greater than 2 years  41 






















2 s =  























3 s =  






Note:  Estimates in classes with less than 10 observations are not shown. The first row in each cell is the number of units in 
the cell; the second row shows the estimated human capital parameter σ  and its standard error in brackets. The final 
row in each of the cells is the average of the projected stochastic shock in each cell. All estimates are based on the 
sample observed consecutively unemployed without ALMP over time. Figures in bold show estimates of σ  that are 
significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level. 
Table 9 shows that ‘more experience’ decreases the rate at which human capital depre-
ciates for similar unemployment durations. For example, skill class 2 individuals who have been 
unemployed for a period lasting between 7 and 18 moths with labour market experience for at 
most 2 years experience depreciating human capital at the rate of 46.4% between two con- 
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secutive years, while similar individuals with a longer labour market experience (more than 2 
years) experience a human capital depreciation at the rate of 18.4% (between 2 consecutive 
years). Table 8 shows that comparing less to more experience for similar unemployment spells 
implies the same monotonic condition as described in our example, thus suggesting that entering 
unemployment with more experience reduces the rate of human capital depreciation relative to 
low labour market experience. However, looking at individuals with similar experience in the 
labour market but increasing unemployment spells (between rows within column and skill class) 
does not suggest a monotonic gradient for relative human capital changes over consecutive 
periods. 
Overall, Table 9 provides weak evidence for our predictions of human capital depre-
ciation in the event of unemployment without ALMP. The signs are correct as required (at least 
not significantly different than zero if otherwise), but the estimated magnitudes are only weakly 
significant. At best our estimates suggest that in the Swiss economy the data cannot reject the 
potential of human capital depreciation in the event of unemployment without ALMP. 
7  Conclusions 
The paper develops a structural framework to theoretically and empirically analyse en-
dogenous human capital formation in the presence of three distinct labour market regimes: 
employment, unemployment sheltered by passive and active labour market policies, and un-
employment without sheltering, i.e., limited or no access to labour market policies like coun-
selling or training programmes. The three regimes characterize the actual dynamics in the labour 
markets of Western Economies in a stylised way, while the structural model reflects behavioural 
dynamics with respect to the evolution of assets and human capital formation. A crucial assump-
tion in the model is that stochastically changing labour market conditions are accounted for by  
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individuals before these make a labour decision. The presence of ALMP can act as a buffer 
against bad stochastic shocks for those whose preferences, characteristics and labour market 
histories imply a choice of participation in ALMP. The theoretical model suggest that such buffer 
may  translate  into  non-depreciating  human  capital  in  the  presence  of  ALMP  while  not 
participating in ALMP may lead to a period of human capital depreciation.  
The implications from the theoretical model can be directly tested. We do this by ap-
plying a labour market panel data representative of the Swiss population (the SAKE or Swiss 
Labour Force Survey, 1991-2004). Our data is ideal for that purpose because it allow to clearly 
distinguishing between individuals according to their labour market regime while providing 
sufficient information on individual’s labour market history as well as a battery of key socio-
economic indicators. Our estimates suggest that human capital depreciates while unemployed 
without ALMP. No such losses can be detected for unemployed receiving the services of the 
unemployment insurance system. On the other hand, the econometric estimates suggest a clear 
effect of working on learning capacity. In particular, younger cohorts learn faster than older 
cohorts. Overall, our estimates suggest that working and likewise participating in ALMP while 
unemployed does not reduce potential gains from future engagements in the labour market and 
may in fact increment the gains from future active participation. 
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A1.1  Proof of Lemma 1 
Suppose that for a given compact space  t X  for some agent  i  (this index will be 
suppressed in this section) at time t employment is the preferred labour market regime for some 
value  ' π π = .
1 This particular choice of the agent implies the following:  
  ( , , ' | 1) ( , , ' | 1)
s w s w
vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt V a h I V a h I π π = > ≠   (L.1) 
Since a larger value of the shock strictly increases future human capital while working 
(something that does not happen in the other states) and in turn this (strictly) increases future 
earnings and thus future consumption possibilities, and because the period’s returns from wages 
increase as well, for any larger value of the shock ( '' ' π π ≥ ), the person works as well:  
 
( , , '' | 1) ( , , ' | 1) ( , , ' | 1)
( , , '' | 1) ( , , '' | 1)
s w s w s w
vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt
s w s w
vt vt vt vt vt vt vt vt
V a h I V a h I V a h I
V a h I V a h I
π π π
π π
= > = > ≠
⇒
= > ≠
  (L.2) 
This establishes that there is a value of π , say  ' π , beyond which the agent will always 
choose employment (w) among all other labour market options. But then there is a range of 
values  in  the  distribution  of  π   below  which  contemporaneous  and  future  earnings  from 
employment are so low that the agent’s optimal choice would be non-employment. Say this 
happens at 
* π π = . Then for any lower value (
** π ,
** * π π < ), the individual won't work either, 
because when the value of the shock declines employment becomes less attractive compared to 
the non-employment options. Thus, a threshold 
R
b π  defined in terms of  vt X  exists that completely 
characterizes the decision between choosing employment or not. The threshold 
R
b π  depends on  
  A.1 
assets and human capital accumulated so far as well as on state of nature (i.e. the realisations of 
the shock), and determines the circumstances upon which the agent is willing to work.  
For the case 
R
b π π ≤ , it remains to analyse the choice between the two non-employment 
alternatives. From the financial capital accumulation equation we see that the shock does not 
influence current period physical returns for the non-employment states. If there would be no 
effect of the shock on human capital accumulation, then individuals would all choose state  1
n
it I = . 
However, the larger shock, the less attractive alternative ‘n’ becomes in terms of human capital, 
because the depreciation is increasing in the shock. Suppose there is a value 
R
a π  (
R R
a b π π ≤ ) such 
that individuals are just indifferent between q and n. Because of Assumption 8 (i.e., positive 
prices including  0 st P > ), if π  decreases below 
R
a π  alternative n become more valuable, i.e., 
further loss of human capital declines such that below 
R
a π :  | |
n q
it it it it h I h I →  and  | 0
n
st it P I = . If the 
shock increases above 
R
a π , the alternative ‘q’ gains in value. Thus the monotone reservation 
policy is proved. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
This proof extends that in Lemma 2 Costa-Dias (2002) to cover a third labour market 
regime. In both cases the proof uses backward induction starting with the valued function at age 
T  and showing similar properties for ages 0 to  1 T −  (the index i  is suppressed for simplicity, so 
that for any i ,  ( ) s i t st W W = , etc.) 
At  age  T   the  agent  maximizes  the  contemporaneous  utility  only  as  function  of 
consumption such that 
* (1 ) ( )
w q n
T T T T T T sT T sT sT T sT c r a I h W I B P I B π = + + + − + ; the agent decides to work 
or  not  according  to  the  realization  of  T π   conditional  on  past  labour  market  history  and 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
1   The first part of this proof is similar to Costa-Dias (2002), but allows for a third labour market regime. The 
second part of the proof refers to the third regime explicitly.  
  A.2 
characteristics. Whatever labour market regime the agent decides to select,  1(.) 0
s
T E V π + =  and each 
of the (partitioned) value functions are characterized by the utility of final time period resources: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( , , ) (1 ) (1 ) 1;
( , , ) (1 ) 1;
( , , ) (1 ) 1.
s w
T T T T t T T T sT T T
s q
T T T T t T sT sT T T
s n
T T T T T T sT T T
V a h u r a h W if I
V a h u r a B P h if I




= + + − =
= + + − =
= + + =
    (L.4) 
Allow for Assumption 2 at age  T : the same properties for the utility function carry 
through for the value function for all the three labour market regimes. Allow for Assumptions in 
3.3 and use the conditions in Lemma 1. Let  ( | 1)
s j
T T V I ⋅ =  be the short hand notation of the 
conditional (on  , , j w n q = ) value function:  
( , ) ( | 1) ( 1) ( | 1) ( 1) ( | 1) ( 1)





s s w w s q q s n n
T T T T T T T T T T Tt T
s w s q s n
T T T T T T T T T T T T
E V a h V I P I V I P I V I P I




π π π π π π
= ⋅ = = + ⋅ = = + ⋅ = = =
= = + = + = ∫ ∫ ∫
 (L.5) 
But (L.4) implies that  ( | 1)
s j
T T V I ⋅ =  is strictly increasing, twice differentiable and concave 
in assets for any of the  { } , , j w q n ∈  labour market alternative, therefore, so is the expectation 
( , )
s
T T T E V a h π ; notice that this is also taking into account that at any point in the lifetime of 
individuals, including at T , the reservation thresholds depend on past information and not in the 
present levels of assets (as determined in Lemma 1). 
At ages 0 to  1 T − : The proof has four steps (following Costa-Dias (2002) and adapting 
Stokey and Lucas (1989) to be applicable to any number of labour market regimes)  
  A.3 
Let  ( , ) ( , )
s s
T t j E V a h E V a h π π + = ɶ : The previous step shows that given Lemma 2, the RHS is 
strictly increasing, twice differentiable and a concave function in assets ( ) t a . 
Step 1: We show that the conditional value functions  ( | 1)
s j
t t V I ⋅ =  are increasing, twice 
differentiable and concave in (physical) assets. Given that  ( ) t j u c + ɶ  is concave (Assumption 2) and 
( |)
s
t j E V π + ⋅ ɶ  are strictly increasing, concave and twice differentiable in  t j c + ɶ  and  t j a + ɶ , standard 
recursive methods show that for bounded objective functions,  1( |)
s
t j V + − ⋅ ɶ  has identical properties 
that  ( |)
s
t j E V π + ⋅ ɶ .  
The proof can be found in Stokey and Lucas (1989), Chapter 9, page 261. Furthermore, 
take expectations on  1( |)
s
t j V + − ⋅ ɶ  over the support so that we define  1( |)
s
t j E V π + − ⋅ ɶ . The latter could be 
represented as  1( |)
s
t E V π + ⋅  for any t in the working life of an individual. Then, the same standard 
recursive methods in Stokey and Lucas (1989) imply that with  1 ( ) t u c +  and  1( |)
s
t E V π + ⋅  strictly 
increasing, twice differentiable and concave in  1 t c +  and  1 t a + , respectively, the value function 
( , , |.)
s
t V k h π  is strictly increasing, twice differentiable and a concave function in assets ( ) t a . 
Step 2: We show that the reservation value 
R
b π  for the labour market shock  t π  is 
continuous in assets  ( ) t a  . The monotonic relation between 
R
a π  and 
R
b π  implies that both 
reservation values are continuous and differentiable (at least once) in assets ( ) t a .  
The reservation values 
R
a π  and 
R
b π  both solve the equalities between the three value-
functions determined by the three labour market choices. Furthermore, Step 1 implies the 
continuous differentiability (with respect to assets) of the value functions for any given labour 
market regime. Since assets are an increasing, continuous and differentiable function of human 
capital  vt h , the value functions are also strictly increasing, twice differentiable, concave functions  
  A.4 
with respect to human capital. Take, for example, the threshold 
R
b π . We know from Lemma 1 
that this threshold solves the equality given by  ( , , | 1) ( , , | 1)
s R w s R q
t b t t b t V a h I V a h I π π = = = , where the 
latter is a function of the same arguments in the neighbourhood of 
R
b π . All the above implies the 
following: 
(a)  The partial derivatives  (| ), (| ), (| ) h a V I V I and V I π  exist. That is, Assumption 1 
and Step 1 guarantee the existence of these partial derivatives for any labour 
market option (notice that for  ( ) (| ) a
h h a V I V ∂
∂ = ⋅  so that the existence of the 
partial derivative with respect to human capital is also guaranteed.) 
(b)  Suppose we can define a point ( , , )
R R R
b a h π . From Lemma 1 we know that 
R
b π  
solves the equality  ( , , | 1) ( , , | 1)
s R w s R q
t b t t b t V a h I V a h I π π = = = , therefore, this must 
also happen so that  ( , , | 1) ( , , | 1)
s R R R w s R R R q
t b t t b t V a h I V a h I π π = = = . That is, at 
this point the equality is also true. Since the value function is continuous and 
differentiable over the support of π , and 
R
b π  is in the support [ , ] π π , then the 
derivative 
( , , | )
0
R R R





 in the neighbourhood of that point. 
The Implicit Function Theorem says that if a function  ( , , ): , ,
n m V a h D m n π → < ℝ  complies 
with  conditions  (a)  and  (b),  then,  there  exists  a  function  ( , ) g h a   such  that 
( , , ( , )| 1) ( , , ( , )| 1)
s R R w s R R q
t t t t V a h g a h I V a h g a h I = = =  in the neighbourhood of  ( , , )
R R R
b a h π . This 
function  has  an  implicit  representation,  say  ( , )
R g a h π = ,  satisfies  ( , )
R R R
b g a h π = ,  and  is 
continuous and at least once differentiable in its arguments. Notice also that in our model 
( ) a a h = , and not the other way around. Assume both  ( , ) a h  follow monotonically the same 
direction as is the case for fixed labour market regimes. Stokey and Lucas (1989, page 290) show 
that the model can be reformulated in terms of only one endogenous variable with the recursive  
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solution applying identically to the reformulated problem. Thus, we can let  ( )
R R
b b a π π = . The one-
to-one mapping is guaranteed. 
The same argument can be applied to the reservation value 
R
a π  that solves for the equality 
between the value functions  ( , , | 1) ( , , | 1)
s R q s R n
t a t t a t V a h I V a h I π π = = = . In both cases we have shown 
that Assumptions 1 and Step 1 allow for the application of the Implicit Function Theorem, and 
this ensures that both reservation policies are continuous differentiable functions (at least once) 
of assets ( ) t a . This is to be used in further steps. 
Step 3: Allowing for Assumption 1 and the interpretation of the reservation policies in 
Lemma 1, the expected value function at time t can be written as follows:  
( , ) ( , | 1) ( )








t t t t t t t
s q s n
t t t t t t t t
E V a h V a h I f d







π π π π
= = +
+ = + =
∫
∫ ∫   (L.6) 
Step 1 determines that  ( | 1)
s j
t t V I ⋅ =  is strictly increasing, twice differentiable and concave 
in physical assets for all three labour market regimes. Step 2 determines that the reservation 
policies are continuous differential functions of assets, and the differentiability of the joint 
density function of the productivity shocks is also guaranteed in Assumption 1. Therefore, 
( , )
s
t t t E V a h π  is also twice differentiable with respect to assets  t a . This is a necessary condition for 
Step 4 below. 
Step 4: We show that the value function  ( , )
s
t t t E V a h π  is an increasing and concave 
function of assets  t a . 
Step 3 allows for the following representation for the first derivative of  ( , )
s
t t t E V a h π :  
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) { }
( ) { }
,
,
(.| 1) (.| 1) (.| 1) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( )
(.| 1) (.| 1) ( ) (L.7)
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The last two terms in the RHS vanish at the reservation value in the density function of π  
(the value functions are identical), while the first derivatives with respect to assets are all positive 
since Step 1 ensures that the conditional value function is strictly increasing. Therefore it follows 
that ( ) ( , ) 0
s
t t EV a h a ∂ ∂ > . All what is needed for concavity is to show that ( )
2 2 ( , ) 0
s
t t E V a h a ∂ ∂ < . 
From (L.7), the second order derivative is given by: 
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2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
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    =         ∂      
 
The first three terms in the RHS of (L.8) are negative because of the concavity of the 
conditional value functions. But the value of the last two terms in (L.8) depend on the relative 
degree of concavity between paired labour market regimes (i.e. between 
q
t I  and 
w
t I , and between 
n
t I  and 
q




π   ∂
  ∂  
 and  




π   ∂
  ∂  
).
2 Assumption 4 states that individuals are risk averse in the sense that an increase in 
assets reduces the reservation policy (subjective valuation of labour market choice) thus making 
employment more likely than non-employment in the future for any random shock. Likewise, an 
increase in assets as result of non-decreased in human capital (rather than depreciation) implies 
that  program  participation  becomes  more  likely  than  ‘unemployment  without  program 




π   ∂





π   ∂
  ∂  
<0 are implied by Assumption 4 as well as being consistent with our model (see 
introductory notes). But, if an increase in physical assets implies reducing the respective 
reservation policies through an increase in the willingness to take risk the implication is that for 
any given assets level,  t a , comparing the value functions between labour market regimes implies 
that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1)
w q n
t t t V I a V I a V I a ∂ ⋅ = ∂ > ∂ ⋅ = ∂ > ∂ ⋅ = ∂ .
3 Decreasing absolute risk aversion 
and derivatives of value functions that are increasing as taste for risk increases implies that the 
                                                           
2   That is, as stated in the introduction, individual’s hold latent valuation on each of the labour market regimes that 
we define as ‘reservation valuation policy set’. These sets depend on individual’s taste for risk possible 
determined by individual’s history, characteristics, etc: Lemma 1 embodies this idea. Each time the agent has to 
evaluate the labour market conditions as the shock is realized, they compare the realized shock  t π to own 
reservation policy that explains individual’s taste for risk ( )
R
t π , and make a labour market choice. Since the risk 
attitude is given by the set of reservation policies ( )
R
t π , risk aversion is measured by the change on this with 






∂  explain the concept of risk aversion (coefficient of risk aversion). 
3   That is, expected value of a choice is the weighted sum of the three possible choices so that expectations of the 
value function is  (| ) ( ) (| ) ( ) (| ) ( ) EV V I w P w V I q P q V I n P n = = + = + = , and the choice among the 
three alternative depends on the realization of the shock that will determine the weight (probability). But 
independently, each of the value functions is an increasing, twice differentiable and concave function of assets,  
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second and third terms in the RHS of (L.8) can be positive and overtake the negative value of the 
first three terms. Then, concavity of the valued function can only be guaranteed if we assume 
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π   ∂
  ∂  
=0. This would imply that 
the  reservation  policies  are  not  responsive  to  changing  wealth  that  is  neither  a  realistic 
assumption, not is it completely consistent with our structural model. Thus, Assumption 4 is 
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π   ∂
  ∂  
<0, but by a 
magnitude that is ‘not too large’ (both values are assumed to be bounded from below in the 
neighbourhood of zero) guarantees that the positive terms in the last two parts of the RHS in 
(L.8) never overtake the negative values of the set of second derivatives. This is the only way to 
guarantee concavity.  
A1.3  Proof of Lemma 3 
Given Lemma 2 (i.e., having established the conditions for a well behaved value function), the 
Euler Equation is the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal consumption decision 
‘for fixed labour market regimes’ (since it is within labour market regimes that the value function 
is continuous, twice differentiable and concave function of assets). Recall the Euler Equation:  
 
1 ( , ) ( , )
(1 )






  ∂ ∂
  = + ∀
∂ ∂    
  (L.9) 
But (L.9) gives the optimal intertemporal relation for the choice variable assuming 
concavity of the value function only with respect to assets, when in reality the problem in (2) 
implies a more complex set of dynamics in the state space. Then, there must be as many optimal 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
while the value of the value function for the working choice has to be steeper than for the non-employment 
alternatives and in turn. At this point is when we need to apply Assumption 5 (no crossing of the value functions).   
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consumptions paths that are consistent with (L.9) as possible values of  1 t h +  that are consistent 
with the assets path ( ) t a  that underlines (L.9). Then identification/characterization of the optimal 
consumption path is only possible if we find an expression analogous to (L.9) such that the new 
expression implies restrictions for human capital. Recall Step 1 in the proof of Lemma2. This 
step states that under the regularity assumptions for  ( ) u c  and  1( |)
s
t E V π + ⋅  in  t c  and  1 t a + , standard 
recursive methods show that  ( | 1)
s j
t t V I ⋅ =  has identical properties than  1( |)
s
t E V π + ⋅ . First we apply 
the envelope theorem to  ( | 1)
s j
t t V I ⋅ =  so that at the optimal consumption choice and for fixed 
labour regime, a change in assets implies zero additions from future changes in the value 
function: 
1
*( ), ( , ) 1 *( ), ( , )
1
*( ), ( , ) 1 *( ), ( , )
(.| (.| )
(.|









c t I j t t c t I j t
t t
V I u V I E a a a














    (L.10) 
Since  ( ) (.| ) (1 ) '( )
s j
t t t t V I a r u c ∂ ∂ = +   and  ( | 1)
s j
t t V I ⋅ =   has  identical  properties  than 
1( |)
s
t E V π + ⋅ , we take expectations so that  ( ) 1 1 1 1 (.| ) (1 ) '( )
s j
t t t t t t E V I a r E u c + + + + ∂ ∂ = + ; the result is labour 
market regime and skill specific. The result is then applied to the Euler Equation in (L.9): 
     
1 1 1
1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( , )
s
t t t t
t
t t I j I j






  ∂ ∂
  = ⋅
∂ ∂    
         (L.11) 
Expression (L.11) maintains the same properties as the Euler condition in (L.9) but we 
have now established a relation between current consumption and the other dynamic variable in 
the  system,  human  capital.  We  are  now  closer  to  identifying  the  optimal  condition  for 
consumption (optimal consumption path) taking into account the full dynamic system. Notice  
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from the dynamics in (1) that the two endogenous state variables always follow the same 
direction, while the value function is concave in assets. This means that the derivative in the RHS 
of (L.11) is positive for any value of  1 t h + , with this latter variables also increasing as  1 t a +  
increases. At the same time (L.11) explains that any marginal change in utility today has to be 
matched by an equal but weighted expected marginal change in tomorrow’s utility establishing a 
precise relation between the concavity of  (.) u  and  (.) EV  with respect to the variables  t c and  t a . 
From the dynamics in (1) we see that this must imply that we are pinning down the optimal 
human capital path. That is  1 ( ) (1 ) ( , , )| t t I j t a r a INC h W c π + = + + − . Then, for fixed working 
conditions, any increase in assets has to be met by an increase in consumption so that (L.11) is 
satisfied, and this leaves no room for  1 t h +  to move other than whatever value satisfies (L.11). In 
other words, (L.11) can be re-written as:  
     
1 1 1 1
1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( , | )
s
t t t t t
t
t t I j I j




+ + + +
+
  ∂ ∂
  = ⋅
∂ ∂    
        (L.12) 
Then, given the properties of the value function, the values of the state variables and for 
fixed skills and working decisions, the optimal condition for consumption is given by (L.12). 
With this (allowing for all regularity conditions and assumptions above), the problem in (2) has a 
unique solution ‘for fixed labour market regimes’ and for given skill type. In the development of 
(L.12) we have seen that agents are restricted to be risk averse. Expression (L.12) places further 
restriction in the variables that determine the behaviour of individuals: consumption ( ) t c  and 
savings  1 ( ) t a +  must both be normal goods in the sense that an increase in net income must be 
followed by an increase in both consumption and assets for fixed labour market regimes. The 
reason is the following: suppose ‘total net income’ increases (for example as result of an increase 
in human capital, but also as result of any other change in the state space ). From the low of  
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motion in assets (see (1)), the implication is that either  1 ( ) t a +  or ( ) t c  increase. But both u  and 
EV  are concave functions, therefore, both must increase to keep the equality in (L.12) satisfied. 
Another way to interpret this is as follows: allowing for  ( , ) EV a h  in L.11 does not pin down a 
specific optimal path among all possible optimal paths given all admissible h paths, so L.11 is 
necessary  but  not  sufficient.  Conditioning  on  h  implies  that  the  Euler  is  now  based  on 
( , | ) EV a h h  thus restricting the relation between assets and consumption so that the marginal 
intertemporal gains are now fixed for given labour market conditions. This latter is what allows 
to identify the optimal path but at the expense of further restrictions on the type of consumption 
and savings that individuals are allowed to consume and hold. 
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 complete the set of regularity conditions that allow for expression (2) 
to represent the individual’s problem, for the problem to be well defined and for this to have a 
unique solution (identification of an optimal consumption path). At the same time, expression (2) 
is based on (1) and we have shown that the structural model as specified in (1) is well behaved. 
This is what allows us to use the characterization of the endogenous variables to specify the 
reduced form specification, and with this to estimate the parameters. In reality, what is crucial is 
to make sure that for fixed labour market regimes the dynamic endogenously changing variables 
change all monotonically in the same direction. Our specification is correct because the newly 
introduced labour market regime still maintains such monotonic relation. Assuming a well 
behaved bounded functions in a bounded support (for anyone of the three labour market 
regimes), the problem boils down to ‘maximising a concave function’ subject to a set of 
constrain that ‘do not jump in different directions in some unspecified form’: this is also 
guaranteed. Because in our case these constrains also behave monotonically, the problem can be 
placed in the shape of a value function with behaviour that is driven by the dynamics in the 
model, thus the value function is also well behaved. The regularity conditions for the value  
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function implies three constrains (risk aversion, consumption is normal and savings is also a 
normal good). This completes the theoretical part (the structural model and its conditions).  
Appendix 2 
Probit estimates for the conditional probabilities  , 1 1 , ( 1| ; ), ( 1| ; )
w w w w
t t t b t t t b P I P I γ γ + + = Κ = Κ  and 
1 1 1 ( 1| ; ), ( 1| ; )
n n n n
t t ta t t t a P I P I γ γ + + + = Κ = Κ . The samples used in each of the four cases are based on the 
distribution from Table 1 so that estimates for period t  are based on 48,653 units, and estimates 
for period  1 t +  are based on 45,222. The 3,431 drop in sample between periods results from 
those who move to be non-classified in one of the labour market regimes after period t .  
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Table A2.1: Probit Estimates for the outcomes working (versus not working) and 
unemployment without ALMP (versus working and unemployed with ALMP) 
Dependent  
Variable 
Working     Unemployed without ALMP 
Time Period  t  
Coefficient    s.e 
1 t +   
Coefficient    s.e 
  t  
Coefficient    s.e 
1 t +  




Lives in German Canton 
Household size 
Permanent Partner present 
Household ownership 
Primary Industry (Agro, fishery, 
mine) 
Secondary Industry (Manufacturing) 
Skill Class 1 
Skill Class 2 
Natural Logs, Net household income 
Labour market experience <= 6 
months 
Labour market experience <=12 
months 
Labour market experience <=18 
months 
Labour market experience <= 2 
years 
Labour market experience <= 4 
years 
Time dummy, 1991 
Time dummy, 1992 
Time dummy, 1993 
Time dummy, 1994 
Time dummy, 1995 
Time dummy, 1996 
Time dummy, 1997 
Time dummy, 1998 
Time dummy, 1999 
Time dummy, 2000 
Time dummy, 2001 
Time dummy, 2002 
Unemployed for 6 or less moths 
Unemployed for 12 or less months 
Unemployed for 18 or less moths 






























































































































Note:  All estimates are based on truncated probits (expressed,15, Section 4) with points  [0.000001,23.8] [ , ] π π =  as the 
points used for truncating the likelihood function. Table 1 explains the sample sizes used for estimating each of the 
specifications in the table. For example, estimates for the working outcome at period t , conditionally compares 45,826 
working males to (980+1,847) non-working males to estimate the coefficients in columns 2, whereas for column 3 (at 
1 t + ) the comparison is between 42,438+322+264 working males against (545 + 607 + 236 + 128 + 97 + 585) non-
working individuals who are still active labour market participants. Similarly, Table 1 shows the sizes involved in 
estimating the coefficients in columns 4 and 5. The omitted variables are ‘lives in a non-German speaking canton’, 
tertiary (service) sector, skill class 3 (the highest skill considered), ‘has working experience greater than 48 months’ 
and specifically for columns 4 and 5 ‘has been unemployed for more than 2 years’. Furthermore we omit the time 
dummies for 2002 and 2003. We consider significance at 5% level or below with bold coefficient suggesting such level 
of significance. All p-values for the diagnostics suggest rejecting overall heteroscedasticity and acceptance of the 
specification by means of the likelihood ratio.  